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The Implementation Duality
1 Introduction
Much of the theory of mechanism design with quasilinear utility can be developed from a
linear programming perspective, with duality-based arguments taking center stage (Vohra,
2011). The fundamental duality of linear programming also plays a central role in the theory
of matching models with quasilinear (transferable) utility, from the theory’s inception in
Shapley and Shubik (1972) to the more recent adoption of optimal transport methods (cf.
Galichon, 2016) that are based on the Kantorovich duality for infinite dimensional linear
programs (Villani, 2009). These are not disparate applications of linear programming. Rather,
there is a deep connection between mechanism design and matching problems (in their guise
as optimal transport problems) with quasilinear utility (Ekeland, 2010). Intuitively, this
connection arises because stable outcomes in matching models with transferable utility are
composed of optimal assignments (obtained as the solution to a primal linear programming
problem) together with optimal utility profiles (obtained as the solution to the dual linear
programming problem) that implement the optimal assignment in the sense of making it
incentive compatible for all agents to choose their designated partners.
Models based on quasilinear utility, though analytically convenient, are ill-suited for
mechanism design problems in which the stakes are sufficiently large to make income effects or
risk aversion salient (e.g. Mirrlees, 1971; Stiglitz, 1977), and are also ill-suited for matching
problems in which—either because of income effects or because of the structure of the
underlying bilateral relationship (Legros and Newman, 2007; Chiappori and Salanié, 2016;
Galichon, Kominers, and Weber, 2016)— utility is imperfectly transferable.
This paper studies implementation without invoking quasilinearity. In so doing, we lose
access to the linear programming duality and hence cannot make use of it to characterize
implementable assignments and their attended profiles. Our first step is to uncover a more
abstract duality relationship, known as a Galois connection (Birkhoff, 1995, p. 124), that
still induces substantial structure. In particular, it is well understood that the solution to the
quasilinear optimal assignment problem gives rise to a second layer of duality—the optimal
utility profiles are generalized conjugate duals of each other, and the optimal assignment
is drawn from the argmax correspondence of the maximization problems inducing this
duality (Galichon, 2016, Chapter 7). We exploit the properties of the Galois connection
to show that these properties do not require quasilinear utility—implementability is in
general characterized by utility profiles that are abstract conjugate duals of each other, and
the assignment is drawn from the corresponding argmax correspondence. Moreover, these
properties characterize pairwise stable outcomes in matching problems (with the addition of
participation constraints then giving rise to a characterization of stable outcomes).
The first part of the paper, consisting of Sections 2 and 3, provides the theoretical founda-
tion. Section 2 sets the stage and acquires the basic machinery for studying implementation.
Section 3 introduces a pair of maps, called implementation maps, shows that they constitute
a Galois connection, and uses this duality structure to characterize implementability.
The second part of the paper, Sections 4 to 6, illustrates the potential application of
our results by developing an “abstract duality” approach to two-sided matching problems
and then extending this approach to adverse-selection principal-agent problems. We must
1
add somewhat different additional elements to our basic structure in order to obtain a
matching model or a principal-agent model, but there nonetheless remains a fundamental
and important connection between the two models: a profile is implementable in a principal-
agent model if and only if it corresponds to a stable match in a naturally corresponding
matching model. This relationship allows us to transfer arguments back and forth between
the two models.
Section 4 examines two-sided matching models. We first establish the connection between
implementable profiles and stable outcomes. We then use our duality results to leverage
familiar existence results for matching models with a finite number of agents in order to
obtain an existence result for more general models. Finally, we establish lattice results for
sets of stable utility profiles.
Section 5 turns to adverse-selection principal-agent models. Our first finding is an
existence result. The important step here is a strengthening of the taxation principle, showing
that we can restrict attention to implementable tariffs when formulating the principal’s
maximization problem. Once again, this allows us to exploit our duality results. We next
show that, unlike the quasilinear case, the solution to the principal’s problem may leave slack
in the participation constraint for every type of agent. We explore two sufficient conditions
for a solution to entail a binding participation constraint. One is a strong implementability
condition that captures the essential implication of quasilinearity in a more general form,
and the other is a private values condition on the principal’s payoff. In both cases, the
argument exploits the lattice structure of the set of implementable utility profiles.
Section 6 considers the special case in which a single-crossing condition holds and type
spaces are one dimensional. We first show that under single crossing, there exists a unique
stable match that is positively assortative and (under common conditions) deterministic.
With our duality results in place, the proof is a straightforward generalization of the one
which yields the existence of a unique, deterministic solution to the optimal transport
problem under supermodularity conditions. It then follows almost immediately from the
parallels between matching and principal-agent models that an assignment is implementable
if and only if it is increasing, just as in the quasilinear case.
We close the paper with a discussion of extensions. We provide further connections to
the literature as we proceed.
2 Implementation
2.1 Basic Ingredients
The basic ingredients of our model are two sets, X and Y , and a function φ : X×Y ×R→ R
that we refer to as the generating function.1 We offer two interpretations of these ingredients
Matching model. X and Y describe the possible types of two disjoint sets of agents that
we refer to as buyers (X) and sellers (Y ). The generating function φ specifies the utility
frontier describing the feasible utilities that can be realized in a match between buyer type
x and seller type y. That is, u = φ(x, y, v) is the maximal utility buyer type x can obtain
1This term is motivated by the fact that φ plays the same role in our analysis as the generating function
of a duality plays in Penot (2000, 2010).
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when matched with seller type y and providing utility v to the seller. We complete the
specification of a two-sided matching model in Section 4 by specifying measures on X and Y ,
describing the distribution of types, and reservation utilities for the buyer and seller types.
Principal-agent model. X is a set of possible types for an agent, Y is a set of possible
decisions to be taken by the agent, and u = φ(x, y, v) is the utility of an agent of type x,
who takes decision y and provides monetary transfer v to a principal. We complete the
specification of an adverse-selection principal-agent model in Section 5 by specifying a utility
function for the principal, her beliefs over the agent’s types, and reservation utilities for the
agent’s types.
Assumption 1. The sets X and Y are compact subsets of metric spaces. The generating
function φ : X × Y × R → R is continuous, strictly decreasing in its third argument, and
satisfies the full range condition φ(x, y,R) = R for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y .
The conditions on the generating function in Assumption 1 are satisfied if there exists a
continuous function f : X × Y → R such that φ(x, y, v) = f(x, y)− v. In the principal-agent
model this simply means that the agent’s utility function is quasilinear in the monetary
transfer v. In the matching model the quasilinear case arises if both buyers and sellers
have utility functions over partners and monetary transfers that are quasilinear in the
transfer. While this quasilinear case is an important benchmark for our analysis, our main
interest is in generating functions that are not quasilinear. In the matching context, Legros
and Newman (2007, Section 5), Nöldeke and Samuelson (2015, Section 2), and Galichon,
Kominers, and Weber (2016, Section 3) present a number of economic examples giving rise
to non-quasilinear generating functions.2
In the context of the matching model, the assumption that φ is strictly decreasing
excludes the case of nontransferable utility introduced in Gale and Shapley (1962), in which
there is no possibility for compensatory transfers between a pair of matched agents. If the
generating function is quasilinear, we have perfectly transferable utility as considered in
Shapley and Shubik (1972), with Assumption 1 also allowing for imperfectly transferable
utility.3 In the context of the principal-agent model, strict monotonicity of φ in its third
argument squares with the interpretation of this argument as a monetary transfer, while
allowing for income effects. The importance of doing so in models of optimal nonlinear
pricing has been emphazised in Wilson (1993, Chapter 7).
The essential implication of the full range condition in Assumption 1 is that (for example)
for any agent type x and decisions y and ỹ, one can find transfers under which the agent
prefers decision y, as well as transfers under which the agent prefers decision ỹ. Demange
and Gale (1985, Section 3) discuss the importance of the full range condition in the context
2In the simplest case, discussed in Demange and Gale (1985), preferences are directly specified over partners
and monetary transfers between matched partners. Letting uxy(t) denote the utility to x of being matched
with y and making monetary transfer t and letting vxy(t) denote the corresponding utility to y of being
matched with x and receiving monetary transfer t, the generating function is given by φ(x, y, v) = uxy(v
−1
xy (v)).
This will typically be non-linear in v unless both uxy(t) and vxy(t) are linear in the transfer.
3Our terms for the case distinction between perfectly transferable, imperfectly transferable, and nontrans-
ferable follow (for example) Chade, Eeckhout, and Smith (2017) and Nöldeke and Samuelson (2015). Other
authors (e.g. Legros and Newman, 2007) use the term nontransferable utility whenever utility is not perfectly
transferable.
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of the matching model. In the principal-agent model the condition ensures that the taxation
principle is applicable without taking recourse to tariffs specifying infinite transfers (cf.
footnote 9). The assumption that (for any given (x, y)) the generating function maps
from the reals into the reals greatly simplifies the exposition, but is not essential: all of
our analysis goes through if A and B are open intervals in R and the generating function
φ : X × Y ×A→ B satisfies the counterpart to Assumption 1.
2.2 The Inverse Generating Function
Assumption 1 ensures that for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y and u ∈ R, there is a unique value v ∈ R
satisfying u = φ(x, y, v), so that the inverse generating function ψ : Y ×X×R→ R specified
as the solution to
u = φ(x, y, ψ(y, x, u)) (1)
is well-defined and satisfies the “reverse” inverse relationship
v = ψ(y, x, φ(x, y, v)). (2)
The inverse generating function inherits the properties of the generating function stated
in Assumption 1: ψ is continuous, strictly decreasing in its third argument, and satisfies
ψ(y, x,R) = R for all (y, x) ∈ Y ×X.4 Throughout the following, we will freely make use of
the compactness of X and Y and the properties of the generating function φ and its inverse
ψ without always explicitly referring to Assumption 1 or the argument in footnote 4.
In the context of the matching model the interpretation of ψ is analogous to the one
given for φ: the utility v = ψ(y, x, u) is the maximal utility a seller type y can obtain when
matched with a buyer type x and providing utility u to the buyer.5 In the principal-agent
model ψ identifies the largest transfer an agent of type x can pay for the decision y while
obtaining utility level u.6 In either context, as indicated by (1)–(2), the inverse generating
function contains the same information about preferences as the generating function.
2.3 Profiles, Assignments, and Implementability
Let B(X) denote the set of bounded functions from X to R and let B(Y ) denote the set
of bounded functions from Y to R. We refer to u ∈ B(X) and v ∈ B(Y ) as profiles. We
endow B(X) and B(Y ) with the supremum norm, denoted by ‖ · ‖ in both cases, making
them complete metric spaces for the induced metric. We order B(X) and B(Y ) with the
4That ψ is strictly decreasing in its third argument for all (y, x) ∈ Y × X is immediate from (1) and
the corresponding property of the generating function φ stated in Assumption 1. Because φ is defined on
X × Y × R, we have ψ(y, x,R) = R for all (y, x) ∈ Y ×X. Except for a permutation of the arguments, the
epigraph (hypograph) of φ coincides with the hypograph (epigraph) of ψ. As a function into the real numbers
is continuous if and only if its epigraph and hypograph are closed (Ferrera, 2014, Proposition 1.14, p. 5),
continuity of φ is equivalent to continuity of ψ.
5Observe that in the definition of ψ the order of the first two arguments has been exchanged, so that in
the matching model for both φ and ψ the first argument gives the type of the agent whose maximal utility
is specified and the second argument gives the type of his or her partner. In the quasilinear case we have
ψ(y, x, u) = g(y, x)− u, where g(y, x) = f(x, y) holds for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y .
6Mirrlees (1986, p. 1231) introduces a counterpart to the inverse generating function in his analysis of the
optimal income taxation problem. Hellwig (2010, Proposition 2.6) features an application in the context of a
principal-agent model.
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pointwise partial order inherited from the standard order ≥ on R. For simplicity, we also
denote these pointwise partial orders on B(X) and B(Y ) by ≥. The join u ∨ u′ and meet
u∧u′ are respectively the pointwise maximum and minimum of the profiles u and u′. With
these operations the set B(X) (and similarly B(Y )) is a conditionally complete lattice.7
Let Y X denote the set of functions from X to Y and let XY be the set of functions
from Y to X. Any function y ∈ Y X and any function x ∈ XY will be referred to as an
assignment.
We say that (u,y) ∈ B(X) × Y X is implementable if there exists a profile v ∈ B(Y )
that implements (u,y), meaning that the conditions






hold for all x ∈ X (which, obviously, implies that the argmax correspondence Yv : X ⇒ Y
defined in (3) is non-empty valued). Similarly, (v,x) ∈ B(Y ) × XY is implementable if
there exists a profile u ∈ B(X) implementing (v,x), meaning that






hold for all y ∈ Y .
We also say that a profile v implements the profile u (assignment y) if there exists y
(there exists u) such that v implements (u,y). We use the analogous terminology for a
profile u implementing the profile v and assignment x. Profiles and assignments are said
to be implementable if there exists a profile implementing them. We let I(X) and I(Y )
denote the sets of implementable profiles, so that (for example) I(X) = {u ∈ B(X)|∃v ∈
B(Y ) s. t. (4) holds}.
In the matching model u is a utility profile for buyers, whereas v is a utility profile for
sellers. An assignment y specifies for each buyer type x a seller type y = y(x) with whom
x matches; the interpretation of an assignment x is analogous.8 In the implementation
conditions (3)–(4) the utility profile v serves a dual role as a non-linear tariff: v implements
(u,y) if every buyer type x finds it optimal to select seller type y(x) as a partner and by
doing so obtains the utility u(x), given that sellers have to be provided with the utility
profile v. The interpretation of conditions (5)–(6) is analogous.
In the principal-agent model u specifies a utility level for each agent type, whereas an
assignment y specifies a decision for each agent type. The profile v is a non-linear tariff
7A lattice is conditionally complete if every non-empty subset that is bounded has both an infimum and
a supremum. Here and throughout the following we simply refer to a set of profiles in B(X) or B(Y ) as
being bounded without distinguishing between boundedness in order and boundedness in norm as these two
notions are equivalent in our setting: A set U ⊂ B(X) is order bounded (i.e., there exists u,u ∈ B(X) with
u ≤ u ≤ u for all u ∈ U) only if it is norm bounded in B(X) (because ‖u‖ ≤ max{supX |u(x)|, supX |u(x)|}
for all u ∈ U), and the converse clearly also holds, as is the case for V ⊂ B(Y ).
8Note that the definition of an assignment does not incorporate any notion of feasibility (e.g., an assignment
x could specify that all types of the seller match with the same type of buyer). In the matching context an
assignment is sometimes referred to as a pre-matching (Adachi, 2000) or a semi-matching (Lawler, 2001).
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offered by the principal to the agent, with v(y) specifying the transfer to the principal at
which any type of agent can purchase decision y. Such a tariff implements the pair (u,y)
if all agent types find it optimal to choose the decisions specified in y when faced with
the tariff v, and u is the resulting rent function. We may think of a type assignment x as
specifying for each decision y an agent type x(y) to whom the principal wants to sell decision
y, as in Nöldeke and Samuelson (2007). Though the interpretation of a rent function u
implementing a pair (v,x) is less obvious in the principal-agent model than in the matching
model, Section 5 shows that the notion of an implementable tariff can be very helpful in the
former.
Remark 1 (Implementability and Direct Mechanisms). In defining implementability we have
taken a nonlinear pricing (rather than a direct mechanism) approach and, in addition, have
required the profiles u and v to be both bounded. The taxation principle (e.g., Guesnerie
and Laffont, 1984; Rochet, 1985) is applicable in our setting and ensures that there is no loss
of generality in using a nonlinear pricing approach when studying principal-agent models.
What is less obvious is that the restriction to bounded profiles is innocent, but this follows
from Assumption 1.9 Appendix A.1 provides the details.
2.4 Strongly Implementable Assignments
We say that an assignment is strongly implementable if it can be implemented while pegging
the utility level of an arbitrary agent at an arbitrary level. Formally, an assignment y ∈ Y X
is strongly implementable if for all (x0, u0) ∈ X × R there exists u ∈ B(X) satisfying
u(x0) = u0 such that (u,y) is implementable. Similarly, an assignment x ∈ XY is strongly
implementable if for all (y0, v0) ∈ Y × R there exists v ∈ B(Y ) satisfying v(y0) = v0 such
that (v,x) is implementable. We will say that a profile u with u(x0) = u0 satisfies the initial
condition (x0, u0) and that a profile v with v(y0) = v0 satisfies the initial condition (y0, v0).
With a quasilinear generating function every implementable assignment is strongly
implementable, so that the distinction between these two concepts is moot. This follows
from the translational invariance of the incentive constraints under quasilinearity: u(x) =
f(x,y(x))−v(y(x)) = maxy∈Y [f(x, y)− v(y)] implies u(x)−t = f(x,y(x))−(v(y(x))+t) =
maxy∈Y [f(x, y)− (v(y) + t)] for all x ∈ X and t ∈ R, so that by choosing the constant t
appropriately a tariff v implementing an assignment y can be adjusted to satisfy any given
initial condition while continuing to implement y (with an analogous argument applying to
implementable x ∈ XY ).
In general, the implementability of an assignment does not imply its strong imple-
mentability. It will become clear as we progress that this causes some salient differences
between the quasilinear and the general case. For example, if every implementable profile is
strongly implementable, then—just as in the quasilinear case—the participation constraint
must be binding for some type of agent in a solution to the principal-agent model considered
in Section 5, whereas this property may fail otherwise (cf. Proposition 10 and Example
2 in Section 5.3). Sections 6.2 and 7.1 identify circumstances in which all implementable
9 In the absence of the full range condition from Assumption 1 this conclusion may fail. To see this, it
suffices to consider an incentive compatible allocation in which type x obtains utility u from choosing y, but
there exists y′ such that limv→∞ φ(x, y
′, v) ≥ u. Then, no matter what transfer v(y′) ∈ R is specified, type x
will prefer to choose y′ rather than y.
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profiles are strongly implementable, ensuring that an important structural property of the
quasilinear case is preserved, even though the generating function is not quasilinear.
3 Duality
In this section we characterize implementable profiles and assignments. Section 3.1 introduces
a pair of functions between sets of profiles that we refer to as implementation maps. Section
3.1 shows that the implementation maps are a Galois connection between the sets of profiles
B(X) and B(Y ). Equivalently, these maps are dualities in the sense of Penot (2010) that are
dual to each other, motivating the titles of this section and the paper. Section 3.2 uses the
structure of the implementation maps to characterize implementable profiles. Building on
these results, Section 3.3 characterizes implementable assignments and Section 3.4 establishes
some key properties of sets of implementable profiles.
3.1 Implementation Maps
Consider any profile v ∈ B(Y ). As X and Y are compact and φ is continuous, setting
u(x) = supy∈Y φ(x, y,v(y)) for all x ∈ X results in a bounded profile u ∈ B(X). Together
with a similar argument for v(y) = supx∈X ψ(y, x,u(x)), this ensures that the implementation
maps Φ : B(Y )→ B(X) and Ψ : B(X)→ B(Y ) obtained by setting
Φv(x) = sup
y∈Y
φ(x, y,v(y)) ∀x ∈ X (7)
Ψu(y) = sup
x∈X
ψ(y, x,u(x)) ∀y ∈ Y (8)
are well-defined. Appendix A.2 proves:
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. The implementation maps Φ : B(Y ) → B(X) and
Ψ : B(X)→ B(Y ) are continuous and map bounded sets into bounded sets.
Many useful properties of the implementation maps can be obtained as a simple conse-
quence of the fact that Φ and Ψ are a Galois connection (Birkhoff, 1995, p. 124) between
the sets B(X) and B(Y ). That is,
u ≥ Φv ⇐⇒ v ≥ Ψu (9)
holds for all u ∈ B(X) and v ∈ B(Y ).10
Proposition 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. The implementation maps Φ and Ψ are a Galois
connection.
10There is an alternative definition of a Galois connection in which the second inequality in (9) is reversed
(Davey and Priestley, 2002, Chapter 7). This difference is not essential, as equivalence between the two
definitions can be restored by replacing B(Y ) with its order dual. The kind of Galois connection we consider
is sometimes referred to as an antitone Galois connection.
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Proof. To obtain (9) observe:
u ≥ Φv ⇐⇒ u(x) ≥ sup
y∈Y
φ(x, y,v(y)) for all x ∈ X
⇐⇒ u(x) ≥ φ(x, y,v(y)) for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y
⇐⇒ ψ(y, x,u(x)) ≤ v(y) for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y
⇐⇒ v(y) ≥ sup
x∈X
ψ(y, x,u(x)) for all y ∈ Y
⇐⇒ v ≥ Ψu,
where the first equivalence holds by the definition of Φv in (7), the second is from the
definition of the supremum, the third uses (2) and that the inverse generating function ψ is
strictly decreasing in its third argument, the fourth is by the definition of the supremum,
and the fifth holds by the definition of Ψu in (8).
To interpret Proposition 1, consider the matching context. Suppose we have a pair of
profiles u and v such that each buyer x ∈ X is content to obtain u(x) rather than matching
with any seller y ∈ Y and providing that seller with utility v(y), that is, the inequality
u ≥ Φv holds. It is then intuitive that every seller y ∈ Y would similarly weakly prefer
to obtain utility v(y) to matching with any buyer x ∈ X who insists on receiving utility
u(x), that is, the inequality v ≥ Ψu holds. Reversing the roles of buyers and sellers in this
explanation motivates the other direction of the equivalence in (9).
The first three statements in the following corollary are standard implications of the fact
that Φ and Ψ are a Galois connection. Our terms for these follow Davey and Priestley (2002,
p. 159).11 The fourth statement in the corollary observes that the implementation maps
Φ and Ψ are dualities that are dual to each other. We use the term duality as does Penot
(2010, Definition 1, page 505), who defines a duality as a map between two partially ordered
sets with the property that for any subset of the domain which has an infimum, the image
of the infimum of that set is the supremum of its image. We say that the implementation
maps are dual to each other if
Φv = inf{u|v ≥ Ψu} and Ψu = inf{v|u ≥ Φv}
holds for all u ∈ B(X) and v ∈ B(Y ).12 As the proof of the corollary is straightforward
and makes clear how one may infer properties of the implementation maps from the mere
knowledge that they are a Galois connection, we include it here.
Corollary 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. The implementation maps Φ and Ψ
[1.1] satisfy the cancellation rule, that is, for all u ∈ B(X) and v ∈ B(Y ):
v ≥ ΨΦv and u ≥ ΦΨu; (10)
11As noted in Birkhoff (1995, Section 5.8), the properties stated in Corollary 1.1–1.2 below are in fact
equivalent to (9) and are sometimes taken to be the definition of a Galois connection (e.g., Singer, 1997,
Definition 5.3 and Remark 5.6). See also the original definition of a Galois connection in Ore (1944).
12In his monograph on abstract convex analysis, Singer (1997, Definition 5.1, p. 172) defines a duality
as a map between complete lattices with the property that the image of the infimum of any set is the
supremum of the image of that set. Penot’s definition provides the obvious generalization to the situation
under consideration here in which B(X) and B(Y ) are lattices, but are not complete. Our usage of the term
dual map is similarly adapted from Singer (1997, Definition 5.2, p. 176).
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[1.2] are order reversing, that is, for all u1,u2 ∈ B(X) and v1,v2 ∈ B(Y ):
v1 ≥ v2 ⇒ Φv1 ≤ Φv2 and u1 ≥ u2 ⇒ Ψu1 ≤ Ψu2; (11)
[1.3] satisfy the semi-inverse rule, that is, for all u ∈ B(X) and v ∈ B(Y ):
ΨΦΨu = Ψu and ΦΨΦv = Φv; (12)
[1.4] and are dualities that are dual to each other.
Proof. We use (9) to establish (10)–(12). In each case we prove one of the two statements;
the other statement follows by an analogous argument. First, for any v ∈ B(Y ) we trivially
have Φv ≥ Φv, so that setting u = Φv in (9) yields (10). Second, let v1 ≥ v2. By (10)
we have v2 ≥ ΨΦv2 and thus v1 ≥ ΨΦv2. Applying (9) with v = v1 and u = Φv2 then
gives the consequent of (11). Third, (10) gives v ≥ ΨΦv. Applying (11) with v1 = v and
v2 = ΨΦv to this inequality yields ΦΨΦv ≥ Φv. To establish the reverse inequality and
hence (12), notice that for every v ∈ B(Y ) we have ΨΦv ≥ ΨΦv, so that using ΨΦv in
place of v and Φv in place of u in (9) yields the reverse inequality Φv ≥ ΦΨΦv.
To confirm that Φ is a duality (with Ψ analogous), let v be the infimum of some set
V ⊂ B(Y ). Corollary 1.2 implies that Φv then is an upper bound of ΦV. Let u be any
upper bound of ΦV . By (9) we then have v ≥ Ψu for all v ∈ V , implying v ≥ Ψu. Applying
(9) again, this yields u ≥ Φv, showing that Φv is the supremum of ΦV. Finally, (9) implies
{u|v ≥ Ψu} = {u|u ≥ Φv}, so that inf{u|v ≥ Ψu} = inf{u|u ≥ Φv} = Φv. An analogous
argument establishes Ψu = inf{v|u ≥ Φv}, so that Φ and Ψ are dual to each other.
To provide some interpretation for (10)–(12) we focus on the first statement in each case
and consider the principal-agent model. The order-reversal property (Corollary 1.2) simply
asserts that all agent types are better off when the prices specified by the tariff are low
rather than high. Intuitively, the tariff ΨΦv appearing in the cancellation rule (Corollary
1.1) specifies for each decision y ∈ Y the highest possible payment compatible with providing
some agent type with the same utility from choosing y than the one which the agent type
obtains from maximizing against the tariff v, thereby making it an “envelope tariff” (see
footnote 13 below). The assertion of the cancellation rule then is that the envelope tariff
ΨΦv obtained from the tariff v specifies payments no higher than the original tariff v.
Finally, the semi-inverse rule (Corollary 1.3) is the assertion that the inequality from the
cancellation rule turns into an equality when the original tariff v solves the problem of
specifying the highest possible payments compatible with providing some agent type with
the utility level u(x) for each decision y.
Remark 2 (Quasilinearity and Generalized Conjugate Duality). In the quasilinear case the






[g(y, x)− u(x)] ,
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where g(y, x) = f(x, y) holds for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y (cf. footnote 5). In this case Φv is a
familiar object, namely the f -conjugate of v, and Ψu is the g-conjugate of u (cf. Ekeland,
2010, Section 3.2). The first three properties noted in Corollary 1 may then be viewed as
generalizing corresponding properties from the theory of (generalized) conjugate duality.
Indeed, the cancellation property (Corollary 1.1) corresponds to the statement that the
biconjugate of any function is smaller than the function itself and the semi-inverse rule
(Corollary 1.3) corresponds to the statement that a conjugate function is its own biconjugate.
These are well-known implications of conjugate duality (cf. Ekeland, 2010, Section 3.4).13
Martinez-Legaz and Singer (1990, 1995) offer other illustrations of how results for abstract
dualities specialize to familiar results from conjugate duality when the generating function
is quasilinear.
Remark 3 (Dualities and Galois Connections). It is noteworthy that the statement in
Corollary 1.4 is not only implied by Proposition 1 but implies it. Therefore, all the
consequences of Proposition 1 that we employ in our subsequent analysis, including Corollary
1.1–1.3, may be viewed as implications of the duality structure of the implementation maps.
The proof is straightforward (cf. Singer, 1997, p. 179): Let u ≥ Φv. Then Ψu ≤ ΨΦv ≤
inf{ṽ|Φṽ ≤ Φv} ≤ v, where the first inequality follows from the order-reversing property
of the duality Ψ, the equality follows from the fact that Ψ and Φ are dual, and the final
inequality from the definition of the infimum. This gives one of the implications of (9); the
other is analogous.
3.2 Implementable Profiles
Comparing the implementation condition (4) and the definition of the implementation map
Φ in (7) it is clear that v ∈ B(Y ) implements u ∈ B(X) if and only if u = Φv holds and, in
addition, the suprema in (7) are attained for all x ∈ X, that is, the argmax correspondence
Yv defined in (3) is non-empty valued. Consequently, the set of implementable profiles I(X)
is contained in the image of the implementation map Φ. Similarly, I(Y ) ⊆ ΨB(X) holds.
The following proposition shows that the reverse set inclusion also holds. Hence, the
images of the implementation maps are precisely the sets of implementable profiles. In the
course of proving this result, it is straightforward to also show that every implementable
profile is continuous.14 LetC(X) ⊆ B(X) denote the set of continuous (and hence necessarily
bounded, since X is compact) functions from X to R, with C(Y ) analogous. Appendix A.3
shows:
Proposition 2. Let Assumption 1 hold. A profile is implementable if and only if it is
in the image of the relevant implementation map. Further, every implementable profile is
continuous. That is,
I(X) = ΦB(Y ) ⊆ C(X) and I(Y ) = ΨB(X) ⊆ C(Y ). (13)
13 In convex analysis, the counterpart of ΨΦv is also referred to as the convex envelope of v, and is the
greatest convex minorant of v (Galichon, 2016, Proposition D.12, p. 157). An analogous property holds
here. First, from the cancellation property, ΨΦv is a minorant of v. Second, consider u satisfying Ψu ≤ v.
Applying the order reversal property twice yields ΨΦΨu ≤ ΨΦv and therefore, from the semi-inverse rule
Ψu ≤ ΨΦv.
14Weibull (1989) has obtained related results in an optimal taxation model with one-dimensional types
and decisions.
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The first step in the proof of Proposition 2 (Lemma 8 in Appendix A.3) shows that
every lower semicontinuous profile implements its image under the relevant implementation
map and that this image is continuous. The proof of the proposition is then completed by
showing that for any profile, its image under the relevant implementation map is the same
as the image of its lower semicontinuous hull.
The continuity (and hence lower semicontinuity) of implementable profiles ensures that
every implementable profile implements its image under the relevant implementation map
and that the attendant argmax correspondences are nicely behaved. For later reference we
state this observation, which is a direct consequence of Weierstrass’ extreme value theorem
and Berge’s maximum theorem (cf. the proof of Lemma 8 in Appendix A.3), as a corollary.
Corollary 2. Let Assumption 1 hold and let v ∈ I(Y ) and u ∈ I(X). Then v implements
Φv and the argmax correspondence Yv is nonempty- and compact-valued and upper hemicon-
tinuous. Analogously, u implements Ψu and the argmax correspondence Xu is nonempty-
and compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous.
Combining Proposition 2 with the semi-inverse rule from Corollary 1.3 yields a charac-
terization of implementable profiles:
Proposition 3. Let Assumption 1 hold.
[3.1] u ∈ B(X) is implementable if and only if u = ΦΨu.
[3.2] v ∈ B(Y ) is implementable if and only if v = ΨΦv.
Proof. We prove Proposition 3.1; 3.2 is analogous. First, we show
u ∈ ΦB(Y ) ⇐⇒ u = ΦΨu.
To establish this, recall that the images of the implementation maps are contained in the sets
B(Y ), resp. B(X). Hence, Ψu ∈ B(Y ) so that u = ΦΨu implies u ∈ ΦB(Y ). Conversely,
if u ∈ ΦB(Y ), then there exists v ∈ B(Y ) such that u = Φv, and hence (by Corollary 1.3)
we have u = ΦΨu. Second, using the above equivalence, Proposition 3.1 follows from the
equality I(X) = ΦB(Y ) in Proposition 2.
The first part of the above proof of Proposition 3 uses nothing but the semi-inverse rule
from Corollary 1.3 to establish that the fixed point condition u = ΦΨu characterizes the
image of the map Φ and, analogously, the fixed point condition v = ΨΦv characterizes the
image of the map Ψ. Hence, this holds for any Galois connection (see also Singer, 1997,
Corollary 5.6). An appeal to Proposition 2 completes the proof of Proposition 3 by providing
the connection between images of the implementation maps and the sets of implementable
profiles. This second step uses the special structure of our duality provided by Assumption
1. Assumption 1 thus plays an essential role in going from a characterization of the images
of the implementation maps (which we are not interested in as such) to a characterization of
implementable profiles.
It is a straightforward implication of Propositions 2 and 3 that the sets of implementable
profiles coincide with the images of the sets of implementable profiles under the relevant
implementation map. That is, we have










u implements v=Ψu 
v implements u=Φv 
Figure 1: Illustration of the implementation maps. The implementation map Φ maps the set
of bounded profiles B(Y ) into the set of implementable profiles I(X) (and Ψ maps the set
of bounded profiles B(X) into the set of implementable profiles I(Y )). The maps Φ and Ψ
are continuous inverse bijections on the sets of implementable profiles I(X) and I(Y ) with
profiles u and v in these sets satisfying u = Φv ⇐⇒ v = Ψu and implementing each other.
To see this, consider the case of an implementable profile u ∈ I(X). By Proposition 3.1 the
profile u is the image of the profile v = Ψu under the implementation map Φ, with the
profile v = Ψu being implementable by Proposition 2. This establishes I(X) ⊆ ΦI(Y ). The
reverse set inclusion is immediate from I(X) = ΦB(Y ) (Proposition 2) and I(Y ) ⊂ B(Y ).
In addition, the implementation maps Φ and Ψ are inverse bijections between I(X) and
I(Y ). That is, we have
u = Φv ⇐⇒ v = Ψu, for all u ∈ I(X) and v ∈ I(Y ). (15)
To see this, suppose u = Φv holds for some implementable profiles u and v. Applying the
implementation map Ψ to both sides of this equality yields Ψu = ΨΦv. As v is implementable,
we have ΨΦv = v from Proposition 3.2, implying Ψu = v. An analogous argument works
in reverse, delivering (15). As the implementation maps are continuous (Lemma 1) the
implementation maps are thus homeomorphisms between the sets of implementable profiles.
Because implementable profiles implement their images (Corollary 2) the equalities in
(14) can be rephrased as the statement that every implementable profile can be implemented
by an implementable profile, with (15) then identifying the unique such profile. In summary,
every implementable profile u is implemented by the implementable profile v = Ψu and,
dually, every implementable profile v is implemented by the implementable profile u = Φv.
Figure 1 illustrates these observations and puts them into the context provided by Proposition
2.
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Remark 4 (Implementable Profiles in the Quasilinear Case). Following up on Remark
2, we note that in the quasilinear case Proposition 3 is the statement that a profile is
implementable if and only if it is its own generalized biconjugate (Ekeland, 2010, Corollary
12).
3.3 Implementable Assignments
Consider an implementable (u,y). As we have just argued, Proposition 3 ensures that u can
then be implemented by an implementable profile, namely Ψu. The following result formalizes
this observation and, in addition, addresses the question whether Ψu also implements y
(and the analogous question for implementable (v,x)). We obtain an affirmative answer.
Therefore, not only all implementable profiles but also all implementable assignments can
be implemented by implementable profiles. The proof is in Appendix A.4.
Corollary 3. Let Assumption 1 hold.
[3.1] The pair (u,y) ∈ B(X)×Y X is implementable if and only if both (i) u implements
Ψu and (ii) Ψu implements (u,y).
[3.2] The pair (v,x) ∈ B(Y )×XY is implementable if and only if both (i) v implements
Φv and (ii) Φv implements (v,x).
Corollary 3 provides a conceptually simple test for deciding whether a pair (v,y) or
(u,x) featuring a continuous profile is implementable:15 Given any such pair, determine the
profile implemented by the profile in the pair. If that profile implements the pair, then the
pair is implementable; otherwise it is not.16
Recall that Yv and Xu, defined in equations (3) and (5), denote the argmax correspon-
dences from the maximization problems that define implementability. From Corollary 3, an
assignment is implementable if and only if it is a selection from one of these correspondences
for an implementable profile. To make progress in characterizing implementable assignments
it is therefore natural to consider the structure of Yv and Xu for implementable u and v.
Given any pair of profiles (u,v) let
Γu,v = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y | u(x) = φ(x, y,v(y))} (16)
= {(x, y) ∈ X × Y | v(y) = ψ(y, x,u(x))},
where the second equality holds by definition of the inverse generating function ψ. If v
implements u, then Γu,v coincides with the graph of Yv, i.e., {(x, y) ∈ X × Y |v(y) =
maxx̃∈X ψ(y, x̃,u(x̃)} = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y | v(y) = ψ(y, x,u(x))}. Similarly, if u implements
v, the equality in the second line indicates that Γu,v coincides with the graph of Xu. For
the special case in which the profiles u and v implement each other, the graphs of both Xu
and Yv thus coincide with Γu,v, indicating that the two argmax correspondences are inverse
to each other. This proves:
15If the profile in the pair is not continuous, then it is of course immediate from Proposition 2 that the
pair is not implementable.
16In the quasilinear case, Corollary 3.1 is equivalent to the statement that a profile-assignment pair (u,y)
is implementable if and only if it is implemented by the generalized conjugate of u. As discussed in Basov
(2006, p. 136 and p. 142) the latter result is the essence of the implementability criterion for the quasilinear
case provided by Carlier (2002, Proposition 1).
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Lemma 2. Let Assumption 1 hold and suppose that u and v implement each other. The
argmax correspondences Xu and Yv are inverses and their graphs coincide with Γu,v, i.e.,
they satisfy
x̂ ∈Xu(ŷ) ⇐⇒ ŷ ∈ Yv(x̂) ⇐⇒ (x̂, ŷ) ∈ Γu,v. (17)
Lemma 2 indicates that the inverse relationship (15) between profiles that implement each
other extends to the argmax correspondences associated with these two profiles.17 Making
use of Corollary 3 this observation leads to the following characterization of implementable
assignments.
Proposition 4. Let Assumption 1 hold.
[4.1] An assignment y ∈ Y X is implementable if and only if there exist profiles u and v
that implement each other with Γu,v containing the graph of y, i.e.,
(x,y(x)) ∈ Γu,v for all x ∈ X.
[4.2] An assignment x ∈ XY is implementable if and only if there exist profiles u and v that
implement each other with Γu,v containing the graph of x, i.e.,
(x(y), y) ∈ Γu,v for all y ∈ Y.
Proof. We prove Proposition 4.1; 4.2 is analogous. First, suppose the profiles u ∈ B(X)
and v ∈ B(Y ) implement each other and let y ∈ Y X satisfy (x,y(x)) ∈ Γu,v for all x ∈ X.
Then it follows from (17) in Lemma 2 that for all x ∈ X, we have y(x) ∈ Yv(x). Hence v
implements y (cf. (3)) and y is therefore implementable. Second, suppose that y ∈ Y X is
implementable, i.e., suppose there exists u such that (u,y) is implementable. Let v = Ψu.
Then, from Corollary 3.1, u and v implement each other and v implements (u,y). From
(3), we then have that for all x ∈ X, y(x) ∈ Yv. Using Lemma 2, it then follows that for all
x ∈ X, we have (x,y(x)) ∈ Γu,v, finishing the proof.
Remark 5 (Implementable Assignments and Strong Implementability). In the quasilinear
case an assignment is implementable if and only if it satisfies the cyclical-monotonicity
condition identified in Rochet (1987, Theorem 1) (see Vohra (2011, Chapter 4) for a
discussion). Importantly, and in contrast to the characterization result in Proposition 4,
cyclical monotonicity is a condition on assignments that does not involve any profiles and
therefore can be verified directly.18 In general, the existence of implementable assignments
that are not strongly implementable precludes any hope of obtaining a condition that allows to
verify the implementability of an assignment without considering the associated profiles. On
the other hand, if it is known that (as in the quasilinear case) all implementable assignments
are strongly implementable, a sharper characterization of implementable assignments might
be possible. Section 6 provides an illustration.
17The counterpart of Lemma 2 in the quasilinear case is the following: if u and v are each others’ conjugates,
then the graphs of both of their subdifferentials coincide with the set of points for which equality holds in
the Fenchel inequality (cf. Ekeland, 2010, Corollary 13).
18In essence, Rochet’s proof of his Theorem 1 shows how to construct u and v satisfying the sufficient
conditions in Proposition 4 if the assignment is cyclical monotone, and also shows that doing so is impossible
if cyclical monotonicity fails.
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Remark 6 (Another Characterization of Implementable Profiles). Proposition 4 charac-
terizes implementable assignments in terms of the argmax correspondences Xu and Yv.
Implementable profiles can be characterized in a analogous way. In particular, suppose the
profile v ∈ B(Y ) is implementable. Then v implements and is implemented by u = Φv
(Corollary 3), implying that both Xu and Yv are nonempty valued. Further, from Lemma
2 the correspondences are inverses of each other, and hence must be onto. Appendix A.5
shows that the converse holds as well. Hence, for u ∈ B(X) and v ∈ B(Y ), we have
u ∈ I(X) ⇐⇒ Xu is nonempty − valued and onto (18)
v ∈ I(Y ) ⇐⇒ Yv is nonempty − valued and onto. (19)
3.4 Sets of Implementable Profiles
We use Uy to denote the subset of implementable profiles I(X) for which (u,y) is imple-
mentable and define Vx analogously:
Uy = {u ∈ I(X) : (u,y) is implementable} (20)
Vx = {v ∈ I(Y ) : (v,x) is implementable}. (21)
We will sometimes refer to these sets as the set of profiles compatible with y, resp. with x.
3.4.1 Metric Structure
The following corollary establishes properties of sets of implementable profiles that play
a key role throughout our study of matching and principal-agent models in the following
sections.
Corollary 4. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then,
[4.1] I(X) is closed and so is Uy for all y ∈ Y X .
[4.2] If U ⊂ I(X) is bounded, then it is equicontinuous.
[4.3] If U ⊂ I(X) is closed and bounded, then it is compact.
Analogously, I(Y ) and Vx are closed, if V ⊂ I(Y ) is bounded, then it is equicontinuous, and
if it is closed and bounded, then it is compact.
Appendix A.6 contains the proof. First, we use the duality results of Corollary 3 to show
that for any converging sequence of profiles in I(X), there exists a converging sequence of
profiles in I(Y ) that implement the former sequence. A limiting implementability relationship
then follows from the continuity of the implementation map Φ (Lemma 1), allowing us to
conclude that I(X) is closed. The result about the closedness of Uy follows by the same
argument. Next, Corollary 4.2 is established by using Lemma 1 and Corollary 3 to conclude
that any bounded set U ⊂ I(X) is implemented by a bounded set V of profiles (namely the
image of the set U under the implementation map Ψ). This combines with the incentive
constraints for implementation and the continuity of φ to imply the equicontinuity result.
Finally, Corollary 4.3 follows from Corollary 4.2 by applying the Arzela-Ascoli theorem.
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3.4.2 Order Structure
The fact that the implementation maps are dualities implies that the sets of implementable
profiles are join semi-sublattices of the lattices of profiles: If, say, u1 and u2 are implementable,
then (Corollary 3.1) there exist v1 and v2 in I(Y ) implementing them, i.e., such that
u1 = Φv1 and u2 = Φv2. Because Φ is a duality (Corollary 1.4), we immediately have
Φ(v1 ∧ v2) = u1 ∨ u2. The implementability of u1 ∨ u2 then follows from Proposition 2.
If it were the case that for profiles u1, u2, v1, and v2 with the properties from the
previous paragraph we also have Φ(v1 ∨ v2) = u1 ∧ u2, then we could conclude that I(X)
is a sublattice of B(X). Indeed, this condition is not only sufficient but also necessary for
I(X) to be a sublattice: An argument analogous to the one in the preceding paragraph
tells us that u1 ∧ u2 implements v1 ∨ v2. Therefore, Corollary 3.2 implies that u1 ∧ u2 is
implementable if and only if it is implemented by v1 ∨ v2.
Alas, Φ(v1 ∨ v2) = u1 ∧ u2 need not hold even if the generating function is quasilinear:
Example 1. Let X = {1, 2, 3} and Y = {1, 2} and let the generating function be given by
φ(x, 1, v) = 1− v,
φ(x, 2, v) = 2 + x− v
for x ∈ X. The profiles u1 = (1, 1, 1) and v1 = (0, 4) as well as the profiles u2 = (0, 1, 2)
and v2 = (1, 3) implement each other. Further, u1 ∧ u2 = (0, 1, 1), v1 ∨ v2 = (1, 4),
and Φ(v1 ∨ v2) = (0, 0, 1). Therefore Φ(v1 ∨ v2) 6= u1 ∧ u2, so that the profile u1 ∧ u2
is not implementable, even though the implementable profile v1 implements u1 and the
implementable profile v2 implements u2.
On the basis of the preceding discussion and Example 1, we may conclude that in general,
I(X) is not a sublattice of B(X) and (for analogous reasons) I(Y ) is not a sublattice of
B(Y ). We do know, though, that the inequality Φ(v1 ∨ v2) ≤ u1 ∧ u2 must hold whenever
v1 ∈ I(Y ) implements u1 and v2 ∈ I(Y ) implements u2: The implementation condition (4)
implies that φ(x, y,v1(y)) ≤ u1(x) and φ(x, y,v2(y)) ≤ u2(x) hold for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y .
As type x obtains utility min{φ(x, y,v1(y)), φ(x, y,v2(y))} from choosing y when faced with
the tariff v1 ∨ v2, we thus obtain φ(x, y,v1(y) ∨ v2(y)) ≤ u1(x) ∧ u2(x) for all x and y and
therefore Φ(v1 ∨ v2) ≤ u1 ∧ u2.
In the argument from the previous paragraph, the inequalities φ(x, y,v1(y)) ≤ u1(x) and
φ(x, y,v2(y)) ≤ u2(x) both turn into equalities if y ∈ Yv1(x) ∩ Yv2(x) holds. For such y we
thus have φ(x, y,v1(y) ∨ v2(y)) = u1(x) ∧u2(x), so that Φ(v1 ∨ v2) attains its upper bound
u1 ∧ u2 if there exists a profile y satisfying y(x) ∈ Yv1(x) ∩ Yv2(x) for all x ∈ X, meaning
that both v1 and v2 implement y. Recalling the definition of the set Uy in equation (20)
this proves the first statement in the following lemma. The proof for the second statement
is analogous.
Lemma 3. Let Assumption 1 hold. The set Uy is a sublattice of B(X) for all y ∈ Y X and
the set Vx is a sublattice of B(Y ) for all x ∈ XY .
We will provide more substantial lattice results when considering the matching model in
Section 4. In preparation for these, we use Lemma 3 to derive one more preliminary result.
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Consider the set of profiles u that are both compatible with a given implementable
assignment y and satisfy a participation constraint, that is, consider the set {u ∈ Uy | u ≥ u}
for some profile u ∈ B(X) that we take to be continuous. As the intersection of the sublattice
Uy (Lemma 3) and the sublattice of profiles satisfying u ≥ u, this set is also a sublattice.
In the quasilinear case it is not difficult to see that this sublattice (i) is non-empty and (ii)
has a minimum element, say u∗, for which the participation constraint is binding, that is,
u∗(x) = u(x) holds for some x ∈ X. The proof of the following result (in Appendix A.7)
shows that these two additional properties do not require quasilinearity but hold under the
weaker condition that the assignment under consideration is strongly implementable.
Lemma 4. Let Assumption 1 hold and let u ∈ C(X) and v ∈ C(Y ).
[4.1] If y ∈ Y X is strongly implementable, then the sublattice {u ∈ Uy | u ≥ u} has a
minimum element u∗ and this minimum element satisfies u∗(x) = u(x) for some x ∈ X.
[4.2] If x ∈ XY is strongly implementable, then the sublattice {v ∈ Vx | v ≥ v} has a
minimum element v∗ and this minimum element satisfies v∗(y) = v(y) for some y ∈ Y .
The main difficulty in establishing Lemma 4.1 (the other case is analogous) is to exclude
the possibility that the minimum element u∗ is strictly greater than u for all x ∈ X. We
resolve this difficulty by exploiting the lattice structure observed in Lemma 3 and the
assumption of strong implementability to construct an increasing sequence of profiles in Uy
that satisfy u(x) = u(x) for some x ∈ X (but may violate the participation constraint) and
then show (using Corollary 4) that this sequence has a limit that satisfies the participation
constraint for all x ∈ X and satisfies it with equality for some x ∈ X.19
4 Stability in Matching Models
This section shows how the results developed in Section 3 can be used to study stable
outcomes in (two-sided) matching models. Section 4.1 introduces the matching model
and defines the stability notions—stable outcomes and pairwise stable outcomes—that we
consider. The notion of a pairwise stable outcome, which abstracts from participation
constraints, is important because such outcomes can be characterized in terms of a pair
of profiles implementing each other together with the argmax correspondences associated
with these profiles. Section 4.2 develops this link. Section 4.3 then exploits it to show how
familiar results for the existence of stable outcomes in matching models with a finite number
of agents can be combined with our duality results to obtain, via a limiting argument, the
existence of stable outcomes in matching models with an infinity of types. The role of the
implementation duality in this argument is analogous to the role of (generalized) conjugate
duality in McCann’s proof (McCann, 1995) of the Kantorovich duality for optimal transport
problems (see also Villani, 2009, Chapter 5).20
19In the quasilinear case a much simpler argument will do: Suppose u∗(x) > u(x) holds for all x ∈ X. As
u has been assumed to be continuous, u∗ is continuous by Proposition 2, and X is compact, there then exists
ε > 0 such that u∗(x)− ε ≥ u(x) holds for all x ∈ X. In the quasilinear case the profile given by u∗(x)− ε is
an element of Uy, contradicting the minimality of u∗.
20Previously, Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1992) have used tools from optimal transport to establish
existence of stable outcomes in matching models with perfectly transferable (quasilinear) utility. Kaneko and
Wooders (1986, 1996) establish an existence result for a class of infinite cooperative games which includes
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The main result in Section 4.4 is Proposition 8, which establishes that the sets of
stable profiles are complete sublattices of the set of stable profile, thereby generalizing a
corresponding result for matching models with a finite number of agents (Demange and
Gale, 1985) to models with an infinity of types.
4.1 The Matching Model
To obtain a matching model, we add to our basic ingredients (X,Y, φ) a pair of finite
non-zero Borel measures µ on X and ν on Y , describing the distribution of agent types on
each side of the market, and a pair of continuous reservation utility profiles u : X → R and
v : Y → R, describing the utilities agents achieve when remaining unmatched. A matching
model is then a collection (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v).
4.1.1 Matches and Outcomes
We follow the optimal transportation literature (Villani, 2009; Galichon, 2016) and Gretsky,
Ostroy, and Zame (1992) in using a measure λ onX×Y to describe who is matched with whom
and who remains unmatched. Formally, a match for a matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) is
a Borel measure λ on X × Y satisfying the matching conditions
λX(X̃) := λ(X̃ × Y ) ≤ µ(X̃) (22)
λY (Ỹ ) := λ(X × Ỹ ) ≤ ν(Ỹ ) (23)
for all measurable X̃ ⊆ X and Ỹ ⊆ Y . We interpret λ(X̃ × Ỹ ) as identifying the mass of
buyers from X̃ who are matched with sellers from Ỹ . Condition (22) indicates that the mass
of buyers with types in X̃, given by the marginal measure λX(X̃), who are matched to some
seller cannot exceed the mass of these buyers, with mass µ(X̃)− λX(X̃) ≥ 0 of the agents
in the set X̃ remaining unmatched. The interpretation of condition (23) is analogous.
An outcome is a triple (λ,u,v) consisting of a match λ and a pair of utility profiles
u ∈ B(X) and v ∈ B(Y ) satisfying the (dual) feasibility conditions
u(x) = φ(x, y,v(y)) and v(y) = ψ(y, x,u(x)) ∀(x, y) ∈ supp(λ) (24)
for matched agents and the feasibility conditions
u(x) = u(x) ∀x ∈ supp(µ− λX) (25)
v(y) = v(y) ∀y ∈ supp(ν − λY ). (26)
for unmatched agents.21 These feasibility conditions require that matched pairs receive
utilities that can be generated in their matches and unmatched agents obtain their reservation
matching models with both perfectly and imperfectly transferable utility as special cases, but to do so resort
to a notion of approximate feasibility. In work contemporaneous to ours, Greinecker and Kah (2016) obtain
existence of stable outcomes for a broad class of matching problems (including problems with nontransferable
utility) with an infinity of types, using tools quite different from the ones we employ.
21By specifying an outcome in terms of utility profiles we are imposing the equal treatment property that
all agents of the same type receive the same utility level. Greinecker and Kah (2016) demonstrate that this is
an innocent simplification. Similarly, by requiring equalities in (24) we are imposing efficiency within each
match rather than obtaining this as an implication of stability.
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utilities. Observe that we require feasibility for all types in the supports of µ and ν. This is
in contrast to the approximate feasibility notion employed in Kaneko and Wooders (1986,
1996).
4.1.2 Stable Outcomes
An outcome for a matching model is stable if it satisfies the participation constraints
u(x) ≥ u(x) ∀x ∈ supp(ν) (27)
v(y) ≥ v(y) ∀y ∈ supp(µ) (28)
and the (dual) incentive constraints
u(x) ≥ φ(x, y,v(y)) and v(y) ≥ ψ(y, x,u(x)) ∀(x, y) ∈ supp(ν)× supp(µ). (29)
A match or profile will be called stable if it is part of a stable outcome.
The stability conditions require that, as indicated by (27)–(28), no matched agent in the
support of one of the type distributions would rather be unmatched, and, as indicated by
(29), no pair of agents in the supports of the type distributions can achieve strictly higher
utilities by matching with each other than by sticking to the outcome under consideration.
Note that conditions (24)–(29) impose no constraints whatsoever on types that do not
appear in the supports of the type distribution and, further, (29) does not preclude the
possibility that some type x in the support of µ might prefer to match with a type outside of
the support of ν (and vice versa). In essence, we are thus treating types that lie outside the
support of the type-distributions as being non-existent in the definition of stable outcomes.22
Remark 7 (Stable Outcomes in Finite-Support Matching Models). To extend results
from matching models with a finite number of agents to matching models with an infinite
number of types we consider finite-support matching models. Formally, we say that the
matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) has finite support if there exists (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Xm and








for all measurable X̃ ⊆ X and measurable Ỹ ⊆ Y , where m and n are natural numbers and
δx (and similarly δy) is the Dirac measure on X assigning mass 1 to x. The (x1, . . . , xm)
(and similarly (y1, . . . , yn)) need not be distinct, so that there could be at most m distinct
types of buyers and n distinct types of sellers, though there could be many buyers (or sellers)
of a single type and hence fewer distinct types.
We can interpret a finite-support matching model as a familiar matching model with
a finite number of agents, where the latter includes a finite set of buyers I = {1, . . . ,m}
22One may then wonder why we do not simply exclude such types from the model by assuming that µ
and ν have full support. The answer is that it will prove technically convenient to consider models—like
the finite-support matching models introduced in the following Remark 7—which violate such a full support
condition.
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and a finite set of sellers J = {1, . . . , n}. Buyer i has type xi and seller j has type yj . The
standard definition of a match for such a model (see, for instance, Roth and Sotomayor (1990,
Definition 9.1)) is equivalent to specifying a measure ρ on I × J that satisfies ρ(i, j) ∈ {0, 1}
for all (i, j) ∈ I × J ,
∑
j∈J ρ(i, j) ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I, and
∑
i=I ρ(i, j) ≤ 1 for all j ∈ J . A
stable outcome then consists of such a match and a specification of utility profiles (u1, . . . , un)
and (v1, . . . , vn) satisfying the natural counterparts to our feasibility and stability conditions
(e.g. (24) becomes ui = φ(xi, yj , vj) for all (i, j) satisfying ρ(i, j) = 1 and (29) becomes
ui ≥ φ(xi, yj , vj) for all (i, j) ∈ I × J).
It is well-known that stable outcomes for a matching model with a finite number of
agents exist if the characteristic function describing the utility frontier available to a pair
of matched agents satisfies our Assumption 1 (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Section 9.4).
Further, every such stable outcome satisfies the equal treatment property (i.e., xi = xi′
implies ui = ui′ and yj = yj′ implies vj = vj′). This allows us to map any stable outcome
(ρ, u1, . . . , um, v1, . . . , vn) for the matching model with a finite number of agents into a stable
outcome (λ,u,v) for our finite-support matching model (see Appendix A.8 for the details of
this construction). In particular, every finite-support matching model has a stable outcome.
4.1.3 Pairwise Stable Outcomes in Balanced Matching Models
We say that a matching model is balanced if µ(X) = ν(Y ) holds, so that the mass of buyers
and sellers are identical. A match λ for a balanced matching model is full if the inequalities
in (22) and (23) hold as equalities,
λ(X̃ × Y ) = µ(X̃) (30)
λ(X × Ỹ ) = ν(Ỹ ) (31)
for all measurable X̃ ⊆ X and Ỹ ⊆ Y , indicating that there are no unmatched agents.
An outcome (λ,u,v) for a balanced matching model is full if it features a full match.
Observe that for any full match the feasibility conditions (25) and (26) are vacuous (because
supp(µ − λX) = supp(ν − λY ) = ∅), so that an outcome is full if and only if it satisfies
(24), (30), and (31). In line with our definition of profiles u or v satisfying an initial
condition (cf. Section 2.4), we say that a full outcome (λ,u,v) for a balanced matching
model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) satisfies initial condition (x0, u0) ∈ X × R if u(x0) = u0, and
satisfies initial condition (y0, v0) ∈ Y × R if v(y0) = v0.
We define a full outcome to be pairwise stable if it satisfies the incentive constraints
(29). Note that full matches and full outcomes exist only for balanced matching models
and that whenever we call an outcome, match, or profile pairwise stable, it is implied that
it is part of a full outcome. Note, further, that whether or not an outcome is pairwise
stable is independent of the specification of the reservation utility profiles u and v. On the
other hand, a pairwise stable outcome is stable if and only if it satisfies the participation
constraints (27) and (28).
Our definition of a full match for a balanced matching model is identical to the definition
of a transportation (or transference) plan in the literature on optimal transport. This allows
us to borrow results from this literature when analysing full matches and full outcomes.
For instance, it is well-known that (under our maintained assumption that X and Y are
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compact) the set of full matches is compact in the topology of weak convergence of measures
(cf. Villani, 2009, p. 45).
4.1.4 Deterministic Matches
In many economic applications it is natural to focus on full matches that can be described
in terms of assignments, thereby identifying for all agent types on one side of the matching
market a unique partner on the other side with whom they are matched. This is captured by
the notion of a deterministic match—corresponding to the notion of a deterministic coupling
or transport map in the optimal transportation literature (Villani, 2009, p.6)—defined in
the following.23
We say that a measure λ on the set X × Y is deterministic and denote it by λy if there
exists a measurable assignment y such that
λ(X̃ × Ỹ ) = µ({x ∈ X̃|y(x) ∈ Ỹ }) (32)
for measurable X̃ ⊆ X and Ỹ ⊆ Y . If such a deterministic measure λ is a full match in the
balanced matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v), then it is a deterministic match.
If λy is a deterministic match then the assignment y must be measure preserving (and
hence necessarily measurable), i.e., ν(Ỹ ) = µ(y−1(Ỹ )) must hold for all measurable Ỹ ⊆ Y .24
4.2 Connecting Implementability and Pairwise Stability
With a quasilinear generating function φ(x, y, v) = f(x, y) − v a match is pairwise stable
if and only if it maximizes the surplus
∫
X×Y f(x, y)dλ(x, y) over the set of full matches.
Standard results from the optimal transport literature then imply that a full match λ is
pairwise stable if and only if it its support is contained in Γu,v for a pair of profiles (u,v)
implementing each other, and that for such a pair of profiles the full outcome (λ,u,v) is a
pairwise stable outcome (cf. Galichon, 2016, Chapters 6 and 7). These results carry over
without any changes to the general case:
Proposition 5. Let Assumptions 1 hold and let the matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) be
balanced.
[5.1] If λ is a full match, then (λ,u,v) is a full outcome if and only if supp(λ) ⊆ Γu,v.
[5.2] If (λ,u,v) is a full outcome and (i) u implements v or (ii) v implements u, then
(λ,u,v) is pairwise stable.
23We focus on assignments y ∈ Y X with all our definitions and observations carrying over to assignments
x ∈ XY in the obvious way.
24In general, pairwise stable deterministic matches do not exist in balanced matching models, even when
the existence of measure-preserving assignments is assured (e.g. when µ is atomless) and the generating
function is quasilinear. Villani (2009, Example 4.9) provides a simple example for an optimal-transport
problem (with both µ and ν atomless) which has no deterministic solution. This example is easily modified
to demonstrate the non-existence of pairwise stable deterministic matches. See also Gretsky, Ostroy, and
Zame (1992) for an extended discussion of related existence questions in the context of a two-sided matching
model and an argument which, when transferred to our setting, suggests that it is possible to interpret any
of the full matches we consider as measure-preserving bijections between suitably enlarged measure spaces.
Greinecker and Kah (2016) pursue such a construction.
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[5.3] If (λ,u,v) is a pairwise stable outcome, then there exists profiles ũ and ṽ with the
properties that (i) ũ(x) = u(x) on the support of µ and ṽ(y) = v(y) on the support of ν, (ii)
(λ, ũ, ṽ) is a pairwise stable outcome for (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v), and (iii) ũ and ṽ implement
each other.
Proof. [5.1] If λ is a full match, then (24) is necessary and sufficient for (λ,u,v) to
be a full outcome. By definition of Γu,v (see (16)), condition (24) holds if and only if
supp(λ) ⊆ Γu,v.
[5.2] If (λ,u,v) is a full outcome, then (24) and (30) and (31) hold. Therefore, (29),
which holds if v implements u or v implements u, is sufficient for (λ,u,v) to be pairwise
stable.
[5.3] See Appendix A.9
If the type measures µ and ν both have full support, Proposition 5.3 is also immediate
from the definitions, and is the statement that if (λ,u,v) is pairwise stable, then u and v
implement each other. Otherwise Proposition 5.3 indicates that the profiles ũ and ṽ in any
pairwise stable outcome can be adjusted outside the supports of µ and ν in such a way that
the suitably adjusted profiles u and v implement each other. In either case, in conjunction
with the other two parts of the proposition, we obtain the conclusion that a full match λ is
pairwise stable if and only if it satisfies supp(λ) ⊆ Γu,v for a pair of profiles implementing
each other.
For a deterministic match λy with implementable y, it is almost immediate from
Propositions 4 and 5 that λy is a pairwise stable match. Obtaining a converse statement is
more difficult because supp(λy) ⊆ Γu,v does not necessarily imply that the graph of y is
contained in Γu,v. Appendix A.10 proves:
Lemma 5. Let Assumption 1 hold, let the matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) be balanced,
and let λ be a deterministic match. Then λ is a pairwise stable match if and only if there
exists an implementable y ∈ Y X such that λ = λy holds.
4.3 Existence of (Pairwise) Stable Outcomes
We begin by exploiting our duality results to establish the existence of pairwise stable
outcomes in balanced matching models satisfying arbitrary initial conditions. Appendix
A.11 proves:
Proposition 6. Let Assumptions 1 hold and let the matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) be
balanced. Then for every initial condition (y0, v0) (and similarly for every initial condition
(x0, u0)), there exists a pairwise stable outcome (λ,u,v) satisfying the initial condition
(y0, v0) in which u and v implement each other.
The proof of Proposition 6 begins by considering balanced finite-support matching
models (cf. Remark 7) with at most n (distinct) types of buyers and at most n (distinct)
types of sellers, and exploiting Lemma 5 in Demange and Gale (1985) to show that such
a finite-support matching model has a pairwise stable outcome (λn,un,vn) satisfying the
required initial condition. In addition, Proposition 5.3 ensures that we can take the profiles
(un,vn) to implement each other. We next construct a sequence of such finite-support
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balanced matching models for which the associated measures µn and νn converge weakly to
the target measures µ and ν. Prokhorov’s theorem allows us to conclude that the sequence
of measures (λn)
∞
n=1 has a subsequence converging weakly to a full match λ
∗. Exploiting





n=1 are bounded, it becomes a straightforward consequence of
our duality results that these sequences have subsequences converging to profiles u∗ and
v∗ implementing each other and that, further, (λ∗,u∗,v∗) is a pairwise stable outcome for
(X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) satisfying the initial condition. This gives us the desired result.
To go from the existence result for pairwise stable outcomes in balanced matching
models in Proposition 6 to an existence result for stable outcomes in any matching model
(X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) satisfying Assumption 1, we consider an augmented matching model. As
in a similar construction in Chiappori, McCann, and Nesheim (2010), in this augmented
model the type spaces differ from X and Y by the addition of dummy types x0 and y0 on
each side of the market. Adding the dummy types x0 and y0 transforms the original matching
model into a balanced matching model in which (i) being unmatched in the original model
corresponds to being matched with a dummy agent in the augmented matching model, (ii)
for an appropriate choice of initial conditions, a pairwise stable outcome in the augmented
model corresponds to a stable outcome in the original model, and (iii) Assumption 1 holds for
the augmented model. Given these properties of the augmented matching model, Proposition
6 implies the existence of a stable outcome for the matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v). The
proof of the following result, in Appendix A.12, shows how to construct an augmented
matching model with the requisite properties.
Corollary 5. Let Assumption 1 hold. There exists a stable outcome (λ,u,v) for the
matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v).
4.4 Lattice Structure of (Pairwise) Stable Profiles
The main result of this section is Proposition 8, which establishes that the sets of stable
profiles are complete sublattices of the sets of bounded profiles. As in Section 4.3, we first
establish a preliminary result for pairwise stable outcomes. This again reflects the logical
structure of the arguments, with the more substantive work occurring in the first step and
the second following from the link between pairwise stable full outcomes and stable outcomes
which underlies the proof of Corollary 5. The results for pairwise stable outcomes will also
be of independent use when we turn to the principal-agent model.
The following assumption simplifies the exposition by ensuring (from Proposition 5.3)
that in every pairwise stable outcome (λ,u,v), the profiles u and v implement each other.25
Assumption 2. The type measures µ and ν have full support.
25This allows us to avoid the adjustments to u or v outside the supports of µ and ν that appear in the
proof of Proposition 5.3.
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4.4.1 The Lattice of Pairwise Stable Profiles
Let
U = {u ∈ B(X) | (λ,u,v) is pairwise stable for some full match λ and v ∈ B(Y )}
V = {v ∈ B(Y ) | (λ,u,v) is pairwise stable for some full match λ and u ∈ B(X)}
denote the sets of pairwise stable profiles in a balanced matching model. From Proposition
6 the sets U and V are non-empty if Assumption 1 holds. The following result shows that
they are also closed sublattices (of B(X), resp. of B(Y )).
Proposition 7. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and let the matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v)
be balanced. The sets U and V of pairwise stable profiles are closed sublattices.
Appendix A.13 contains the proof. The idea behind the proof that U and V are sublattices
is the same as the one behind the Decomposition Lemma in Demange and Gale (1985):
Given two pairwise stable outcomes (λ1,u1,v1) and (λ2,u2,v2) we show that both X and
Y can be partitioned into two sets each, say X into X1 and X2 and Y into Y1 and Y2, such
that both λ1 and λ2 only match buyer types from X1 with seller types in Y1 and buyer
types in X2 with seller types in Y2. Further, when faced with v1 ∧ v2, all buyers in X1
prefer to be matched as under λ1, whereas the reverse preference holds for buyers in X2.
Constructing a measure λ3 on X×Y by matching the types in X1 and Y1 as under λ1 and the
types in X2 and Y2 as under λ2 then yields a pairwise stable outcome (λ3,u1 ∨ u2,v1 ∧ v2).
An analogous argument may be used to obtain the existence of a full match λ4 such that
(λ4,u1 ∧ u2,v1 ∨ v2) is a pairwise stable outcome. Taken together, the existence of the
pairwise stable outcomes (λ3,u1 ∨ u2,v1 ∧ v2) and (λ4,u1 ∧ u2,v1 ∨ v2) implies that both
U and V are sublattices. The closedness claim in the statement of the proposition follows
from the same arguments we have used in the proof of Proposition 6 to establish that the
limit of the pairwise stable outcomes in the approximating finite-support matching models
considered there is pairwise stable.
The proof of Proposition 7 would be much simpler if we could assume that all pairs
(u1,v1) and (u2,v2) of stable profiles are compatible with the same stable match λ.
26 In that
case an argument analogous to that of Lemma 3 would yield that U and V are sublattices.
However, as illustrated by Roth and Sotomayor (1990, Example 9.6, p. 225) and Quint
(1994, Example 6.1, p. 612), this is generally not the case if the generating function is not
quasilinear.
Recall that Lemma 4 in Section 3.4.2 has established that the set of profiles Uy compatible
with a given strongly implementable assignment y satisfying a participation constraint has
a minimum element in which the participation constraint is binding for some type. The
essential properties of Uy used in this proof were that the set Uy is a closed (Corollary 4.1)
sublattice (Lemma 3) of implementable profiles containing an element for every possible
26This is trivially true if there is a unique stable match, as is the case under a strict single crossing condition
(Proposition 12 in Section 6). It is also true with a quasilinear generating function, as with transferable utility
all stable profiles are compatible with the same stable match; see Roth and Sotomayor (1990, Corollary 8.7,
p. 207) for finite matching models and Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999), who also use this fact to establish
a counterpart to our Proposition 8 below (Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame, 1999, Proposition 5), for a model with
an infinity of types.
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initial condition (by strong implementability). The set of pairwise stable profiles U satisfies
the same properties: it is a closed (Proposition 6) sublattice (Proposition 7) of implementable
profiles (Proposition 5.2) with the set {u ∈ U | u(x) = u(x)} non-empty for all x ∈ X
(Proposition 6). Therefore, the following counterpart to Lemma 4 holds for the sets of
pairwise stable profiles (with the proof being identical):
Corollary 6. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and let (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) be a balanced
matching model. Then the set of pairwise stable buyer profiles satisfying the participation
constraint u(x) ≥ u(x) for all x ∈ X has a minimum element u∗, at which the equality
u∗(x) = u(x) holds for some x ∈ X. Similarly, the set of pairwise stable seller profiles
satisfying the participation constraints v(y) ≥ v(y) for all y ∈ Y has a minimum element
v∗, at which the equality v∗(y) = v(y) holds for some y ∈ Y .
4.4.2 The Lattice of Stable Profiles
The connection between pairwise stability in balanced matching models and stability in
arbitrary matching models underlying the proof of Corollary 5 in Section 4.3 allows us to
extend our results about the lattice structure of pairwise stable profiles to results about the
lattice structure of stable profiles.
First, we use Proposition 7 to show that the sets of stable buyer and seller profiles are
complete sublattices. Appendix A.14 proves:
Proposition 8. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. The sets of stable seller profiles and stable
buyer profiles of the matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) are complete sublattices.
Second, we use Corollary 6 to establish a counterpart to Lemma 3 in Demange and Gale
(1985), asserting that in a balanced matching model both the minimum buyer stable profile
u∗ and the minimum seller stable profile v∗ feature binding participation constraints.27
Corollary 7. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and let (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) be a balanced
matching model. Then the minimum stable buyer profile u∗ satisfies u∗(x) = u(x) for some
x ∈ X and the minimum stable seller profile v∗ satisfies v∗(y) = v(y) for some y ∈ Y .
Proof. The claim is immediate from the feasibility conditions (25)–(26) unless all stable
outcomes are fully matched. We therefore suppose this to be the case. The set of stable
outcomes then coincides with the set of pairwise stable outcomes (λ,u,v), satisfying the
participation constraints u ≥ u and v ≥ v. Recalling that for any pairwise stable outcome
(λ,u,v) the profiles u and v implement each other (Proposition 5.3), the result then follows
from Corollary 6 provided that the profiles u∗ and v∗ appearing in the statement of that
corollary satisfy Ψu∗ ≥ v and Φv∗ ≥ u. Recalling that the implementation maps are order
reserving, these conditions must be satisfied (as otherwise the set of stable profiles would be
empty).
27In an unbalanced matching model (satisfying µ(X) 6= ν(Y )) it is trivially the case that in every outcome
there are unmatched agents on the “long side” of the market. By the feasibility conditions (25)–(26) such
unmatched agents receive their reservation utility, so that either the minimum buyer stable profile u∗ or the
minimum seller stable profile v∗ features a binding participation constraint. In particular, if µ(X) > ν(Y ),
then there exists x ∈ X satisfying u∗(x) = u(x) and, similarly, if µ(X) < ν(Y ), then there exists y ∈ Y
satisfying v∗(y) = v(y). Note the existence of u∗ and v∗ is ensured because the sets of stable profiles are
complete sublattices (Proposition 8).
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5 Optimal Outcomes in Principal-Agent Models
This section applies our characterization of implementable profiles and assignments to
adverse-selection principal-agent models. Section 5.1 formulates the principal’s problem
as choosing a measure λ on X × Y , as well as a rent function u and a tariff v, subject to
incentive and participation constraints. Remark 8 explains how this formulation allows us
to interpret triples (λ,u,v) that satisfy the incentive constraints in the principal’s problem
as pairwise stable outcomes in a balanced matching model.
Section 5.2 reformulates the principal’s problem as a nonlinear pricing problem in which
the maximization is over a set of tariffs, and then uses this reformulation to establish that
the principal’s problem has a solution. Moreover, it has a solution in which the measure λ
chosen by the principal is deterministic and thus corresponds to the choice of an optimal
assignment. Our duality results play a central role in this existence argument, with Corollary
3.1 ensuring that we can model the principal as choosing an implementable tariff, and
Corollary 4 ensuring that the resulting feasible set is compact.28
Section 5.3 considers whether the agent’s participation constraint must be binding in a
solution to the principal’s problem. It provides an example to show that this need not be
the case and two conditions sufficient to ensure it, namely that either every implementable
profile is strongly implementable or that the principal’s utility function exhibits private
values. The first result is consistent with our view of strong implementability as a useful
generalization of quasilinearity, while the second makes essential use of the connections to
the matching model.
Section 5.4 introduces the possibility of exclusion into the model.
5.1 The Principal-Agent Model
To obtain a principal-agent model, we add to our basic elements (X,Y, φ) a function
π : X × Y × R → R, describing the principal’s utility of receiving payment v from agent
type x who takes decision y, a Borel measure µ on the set X describing the distribution of
agent types, and a continuous profile u : X → R describing the agent’s reservation utilities.
A principal-agent model is then a collection (X,Y, φ, µ, π,u).
Assumption 3. The function π is continuous, strictly increasing in its third argument, and
satisfies π(x, y,R) = R for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y . The type measure µ has full support.
Let M be the set of Borel measures on X × Y whose marginal distribution on the set X
equals µ. We formulate the principal’s problem as choosing a triple (λ,u,v) consisting of a
28Obtaining compactness of the feasible set (and the requisite continuity properties of the principal’s
objective function) is the main difficulty in the existence proofs in Kahn (1993), Carlier (2001), and Carlier
(2002), who consider special cases of the principal-agent model in which the agent’s utility function is
quasilinear. Using the special structure resulting from the imposition of a single crossing condition when X
and Y are intervals, Jullien (2000) provides a straightforward existence argument which uses Helly’s selection
theorem in lieu of compactness arguments. Working without quasilinearity, the existence proofs in Page
(1991, 1992, 1997) and Balder (1996) impose compactness as an assumption on the set of feasible contracts.
Recently, allowing for stochastic contracts, Kadan, Reny, and Swinkels (2017) have obtained a very general
existence result for principal-agent models with both adverse selection and moral hazard using tools rather
different from the ones we employ. We explain in Section 7 how our approach can be extended to allow for
stochastic contracts and moral hazard.
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π(x, y,v(y))dλ(x, y) (33)




If λ is a deterministic measure λy (cf. (32)), then the first two constraints in this
maximization problem are the standard incentive constraints, requiring that u is the rent
function that results when each agent type maximizes against the tariff v and that all agent
types x are assigned to one of their optimal decisions y(x) ∈ Yv(x). Intuitively, for measures
λ ∈M that are not deterministic, the second of these conditions is weakened to allow the
principal to randomize over the set of decisions that are optimal for the agent.
The principal’s expected utility in (33) is well-defined for any feasible (λ,u,v): Because
supp(λ) ⊆ Γu,v, we have (cf. the definition of Γu,v in (16)) v(y) = ψ(y, x,u(x)) for all









π(x, y, ψ(y, x,u(x)))dλ(x, y), (34)
where the latter integral is well-defined because π, ψ, and the implementable profile u are
continuous (the latter by Proposition 2). A useful implication is that the principal’s payoff
can be written in terms of only the measure λ and rent function u, implying that any two
feasible outcomes (λ,u,v) and (λ,u, ṽ) give the same payoff to the principal.
Remark 8 (Pairwise Stability and Feasibility in the Principal’s Problem). Consider a
triple (λ,u,v) that satisfies the incentive constraints in the principal’s problem, that is, v
implements u and supp(λ) ⊆ Γu,v. Define the measure ν on Y by setting ν(Ỹ ) = λY (Ỹ )
for all measurable Ỹ ⊂ Y and specify an arbitrary continuous reservation utility profile v.
Then λ is a full match for the balanced matching problem (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v). Further it
is immediate from Proposition 5 that (λ,u,v) is pairwise stable in this matching problem.
Vive versa, if (λ,u,v) is pairwise stable for a matching problem (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) in which
µ has full support, then (λ,u,v) satisfies the incentive constraints in any principal-agent
model (X,Y, φ, µ, π,u) in which π has the properties from Assumption 3. See Carlier (2003,
Theorem 2) and, more recently, Dworczak and Zhang (2017) for related observations in the
quasilinear case.
5.2 Existence of a Solution to the Principal’s Problem
To obtain our existence result, we begin by transforming the principal’s problem into a
nonlinear pricing problem over the set of implementable tariffs v ∈ I(Y ). Towards this end,
define the function F : I(Y )×M→ R by





π(x, y,v(y))dλ(x, y) (35)
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and define the correspondence G : I(Y )→M by
G(v) = {λ ∈M : supp(λ) ∈ ΓΦv,v}. (36)
Also, for v ∈ I(Y ) let
Π(v) = max
λ∈G(v)
F (v, λ). (37)
Observe that F (v, λ) is nothing but the objective function of the principal’s problem specified
in (33). The heuristic interpretation of (37) therefore is that Π(v) specifies the maximal
payoff the principal can obtain by probabilistically assigning agents to decision that are
optimal for them when facing the implementable tariff v (which is captured by the constraint
λ ∈ G(v)). Appendix A.15 shows that this problem has a solution for every implementable
tariff, so that the function Π : I(Y )→ R is well-defined. Further, it shows:
Lemma 6. Let Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. The function Π : I(Y )→ R is upper semicon-




then there exists λ∗ ∈ G(v∗) such that the triple (λ∗,Φv∗,v∗) solves the principal’s problem.
The first step in the proof of Lemma 6 uses Corollary 3.1 to show that replacing an
arbitrary tariff v in a feasible triple (λ,u,v) with the implementable tariff Ψu results in
another feasible triple. Doing so leaves the principal’s expected payoff unchanged (cf. (34)).
This allows us to reduce the principal’s problem to the choice of an implementable tariff
v and an associated λ ∈ G(v), with the agent’s utility profile given by the rent function
u = Φv. The continuity of implementable profiles v (Proposition 2) and the compactness
of the set of measures M (Prokhorov’s theorem (Shiryaev, 1996, p. 318)) then ensure that
the function F and the correspondence G are sufficiently well-behaved to imply the upper
semicontinuity of the function Π. Maximizing this function subject to the constraint that
the associated rent function Φv satisfies the participation constraints Φv ≥ u, which we
may rewrite as v ≤ Ψu, then yields an optimal tariff v∗ that together with the associated
measure λ∗, and induced rent function u∗ = Φv∗ solves the principal’s problem.
To show the existence of a solution to the principal’s problem it remains to show that
the nonlinear pricing problem (38) in the statement of Lemma 6 has a solution. To do so, we
begin by observing that the feasible set of the nonlinear pricing problem is bounded above by
Ψu. While there is no corresponding lower bound in the formulation of the nonlinear pricing
problem, it is intuitive that a suitable lower bound can be imposed without impinging on
the value of the principal’s maximization problem. We can thereby restrict the choice set in
the nonlinear pricing problem to a closed and bounded set of tariffs. Moreover, and crucially,
the maximization in (38) is over a set of implementable profiles, and we have established in
Corollary 4.3 that closed and bounded sets of implementable profiles are compact. As Π
is upper semicontinuous (Lemma 6), an application of Weierstrass’ extreme value theorem
then yields the existence of a solution to the nonlinear pricing problem. Appendix A.16
shows, in addition, that the measure in the associated solution to the principal’s problem
can be “purified” to obtain a solution to the principal’s problem featuring a deterministic
match:
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Proposition 9. Let Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then there exists a solution (λ,u,v) to the
principal’s problem in which u and v implement each other and λ is deterministic.
In light of Proposition 9, we hereafter restrict attention to solutions to the principal’s
problem in which u and v implement each other. When convenient, we will further restrict
attention to deterministic solutions (λy,u,v) to the principal’s problem, sometimes denoting
these by (y,u,v) to simplify notation.
5.3 Is the Participation Constraint Binding?
As the principal must respect the agent’s participation constraint when choosing an optimal
tariff, we have u ≥ u in any solution to the principal’s problem. Here we ask whether the
agent’s participation constraint must be binding in the sense that there exists some x ∈ X
satisfying u(x) = u(x).29
If all implementable assignments y are strongly implementable, then the answer is
straightforward from the lattice result in Lemma 4. Appendix A.17 shows:
Proposition 10. Let Assumptions 1 and 3. If every implementable assignment y is strongly
implementable, then the participation constraint is binding in any solution to the principal’s
problem.
As we have noted in Section 2.4, quasilinearity of the agent’s utility function is suffi-
cient but not necessary for every implementable assignment to be strongly implementable.
Proposition 10 establishes that it is not quasilinearity but this latter, weaker property which
ensures that the participation constraint is binding in any solution to the principal’s problem.
In the absence of strong implementability, the conclusion of Proposition 10 may fail:
Example 2. Let X = {1, 2} and Y = {1, 2}. The generating function is given by
φ(1, 1, v) = 3− 2v
φ(1, 2, v) = 2− v






φ(2, 2, v) = 2− v.
Let µ(1) = µ(2) = 1/2 and u(1) = u(2) = 0. Then Assumptions 1 and 3 hold for any
specification of the principal’s utility function π which is strictly increasing and continuous in
v and satisfies the full-range condition. Throughout the following we focus on deterministic
measures, which we may identify with the corresponding assignment y = (y(1),y(2)).
Figure 2 illustrates the set of profiles v = (v(1),v(2)) and, for each such profile, identifies
the assignment(s) y = (y(1),y(2)) implemented by that profile. The two lines, identifying
profiles that make either x = 1 or x = 2 indifferent between the two elements of Y , form
the boundaries of four closed (and hence overlapping on the boundaries) regions, whose
union is the set B(Y ) of profiles v. All assignments y ∈ Y X are implementable, but only
the constant assignments y = (1, 1) and y = (2, 2) are strongly implementable.
29Throughout the following discussion we impose Assumption 3 and, therefore, suppose that the principal’s
utility is strictly increasing in the transfer received from the agent. As noted in Guesnerie and Laffont (1984),



















Figure 2: Illustration of the assignments y implemented by various profiles v, the set I(Y )
of implementable profiles (colored or shaded areas, including the boundary) and the feasible
set for the principal’s nonlinear pricing problem (the portion of the shaded areas for which
v(2) ≤ 2) in Example 2. The profile v̂ = (1, 1) is both the smallest profile implementing
y = (2, 1) and the largest profile implementing y = (1, 2). As a consequence, neither of these
two assignments is strongly implementable. The principal’s optimum implements y = (1, 2)
while leaving both participation constraints slack.
The set of implementable tariffs I(Y ) is the (blue and orange, or dark and light) shaded
area in Figure 2, including the boundaries. This is immediate from Remark 6 upon observing
that these tariffs are the ones implementing assignments that are onto Y .
All tariffs with v(2) ≤ 2 satisfy Φv ≥ u, whereas tariffs in the shaded area of Figure
2 with v(2) > 2 lead to a violation of agent 1’s participation constraint. Hence, the set
{v ∈ I(Y ) : v ≥ Ψu} appearing in the nonlinear pricing problem (38) is given by that
portion of the shaded area in Figure 2 for which v(2) ≤ 2.
As the principal’s utility function is strictly increasing in the payment v, there are only
four candidates for a deterministic solution to the principal’s problem: she could implement
either y = (2, 2) or y = (2, 1) by choosing v = (3, 2), she could implement y = (1, 1) by
choosing (1.5, 2), or she could implement y = (1, 2) by choosing v = (1, 1). Now, suppose
the principal’s utility function is
π(1, 1, v) = v + 5
π(1, 2, v) = v
π(2, 1, v) = v
π(2, 2, v) = v + 5.
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Then it is a straightforward calculation that among those four candidates, choosing v = (1, 1)
to implement y = (1, 2) maximizes the principal’s expected utility. The resulting utility
profile for the agent is u = (1, 1), so that the participation constraint for neither type of
agent binds in the unique solution to the principal’s problem.
Example 2 features common values, in the sense that the principal cares directly about
which type of the agent obtains which decision. This is an essential ingredient in the
construction of the example: In the absence of such common values any change in tariff that
changes the implemented assignment from y = (1, 2) to y = (2, 1) affects the principal’s
utility only through the change in tariff, ensuring that the principal would welcome the
attendant increase in tariff from implementing y = (2, 1) with the tariff v = (3, 2) rather
than implementing y = (1, 2) with the tariff v = (1, 1).
We say that the principal-agent model has private values if the principal’s payoff function π
does not depend on x, i.e., we can rewrite the principal’s utility function as π̂ : Y ×R→ R. As
we have just suggested, with private values no counterpart to Example 2 can be constructed:
Proposition 11. Let Assumptions 1 and 3 hold and let the principal-agent model have
private values. Then in any solution to the principal’s problem, the participation constraint
is binding for some type of agent.
Appendix A.18 contains the proof. The key idea is that any (λ,u,v) feasible in the
principal’s problem corresponds to a pairwise stable outcome satisfying the participation
constraint u ≥ u in a suitably constructed balanced matching model (cf. Remark 8). We
can then apply the result in Corollary 7 to obtain a minimum (in the set of buyer profiles)
pairwise stable outcome, in which the participation constraint binds for some type of buyer.
The principal can implement this outcome, which features the same induced distribution ν
over decisions as the one that we started from. The private-values assumption ensures that
this leads to a strictly higher payoff for the principal than any feasible outcome in which the
participation constraint is not binding.
5.4 Exclusion
Our formulation of the principal-agent model in Section 5.1 does not include an explicit
outside option for the agent; rather it simply insists that the principal must respect the
agent’s participation constraint. It is clear, though, that in the presence of an outside option
the principal may sometimes prefer to exclude some agent type(s) by designing a tariff
that induces them to choose their outside option (Jullien, 2000). Here we show how to
incorporate the possibility of exclusion into our model, explain why this leaves our existence
result (Proposition 9) unchanged, and demonstrate that in the absence of quasilinearity or
private values the principal might sometimes find it advantageous to “bribe” some type of
the agent to be excluded.
To model the agent’s outside option, we follow a strategy analogous to that used
to incorporate non-participation in the matching model. Given a principal-agent model
(X,Y, φ, µ, π, u) satisfying Assumptions 1 and 3, we let Y0 = Y ∪ {y0}, where the outside
option y0 is in the metric space containing Y , but is isolated from it, and extend the definition
of the generating function φ to a function φ0 on X × Y0 × R satisfying Assumption 1 and
φ0(x, y0, 0) = u(x). (39)
31
Hence, in the absence of a transfer (v = 0), agent types choosing the outside option y0
receive their reservation utility u(x). Similarly, we extend the definition of the principal’s
utility function π to a function π0 on X × Y0 × R satisfying Assumption 3 and 5
π0(x, y0, v) = π(v)
for some function π : R → R, with π(0) then specifying the principal’s utility from not
trading.
We will refer to (X,Y0, φ0, µ, π0,u) as the principal-agent model with exclusion. Be-
cause we have supposed that Assumptions 1 and 3 carry over from (X,Y, φ, µ, π, u) to
(X,Y0, φ0, µ, π,u), it is immediate from Proposition 9 that the principal-agent model with
exclusion has a solution (λ,u,v) in which u and v implement each other. Further, because
any such solution respects the participation constraint u ≥ u, it satisfies the constraint that
the principal cannot charge the agent for choosing the outside option.30
Corollary 8. Let Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. The principal-agent model with exclusion has
a solution (λ,u,v) satisfying v(y0) ≤ 0.
Provided that the participation constraint binds for some type of agent in a solution to
the principal-agent model with exclusion, we must have v(y0) = 0, and hence no agent is
paid for nonparticipation. As the extension of the principal’s payoff function to Y0 preserves
private values, this will be the case whenever the underlying principal-agent model satisfies
the private value condition. Similarly, whenever the agent’s utility function in the underlying
principal-agent model is quasilinear and the specification of φ0(x, y0, v) is also quasilinear
(i.e., we have φ0(x, y0, v) = u(x) − v), then the principal-agent model with exclusion will
satisfy quasilinearity, so that as in Jullien’s quasilinear model of exclusion there is no loss of
generality to restrict the principal to tariffs satisfying v(y0) = 0 (Jullien, 2000, footnote 7).
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If the participation constraint does not hold with equality for any type of the agent in
a solution to the principal-agent model with exclusion, then such a solution might satisfy
v(y0) < 0. There are two ways in which this might come about. The first possibility is
that no type of the agent is excluded, but, as in Example 2, all types of the agent obtain
strictly higher utility than their reservation utility. In this case, the optimal (u,y) can also
be implemented by a (non-implementable) tariff v satisfying v(y0) = 0. The second, more
interesting, case is that some excluded type receives the strictly positive payment −v(y0) as
a reward for not taking up any of the decisions in Y . The following example illustrates this
can indeed occur.
Example 3. Let X = {1, 2}, let Y = {1}, and let µ(1) = µ(2) = 1/2. There are thus two
equally likely types of agents, and the principal has the option of either assigning decision 1
30Using the obvious notation for the inverse generating function and implementation map in the model
with exclusion, the formal argument is this: If u and v implement each other, the participation constraint
implies v ≤ Ψ0u. Therefore, we have v(y0) ≤ ψ0(y0, x,u(x)) for all x ∈ X. From (39), the later expression
is equal to zero.
31Strong implementability of the optimal decision function in the principal-agent model (without exclusion)
does not imply that the participation constraint holds as an equality in the principal-agent model with
exclusion. Example 3 below (with only one decision in the absence of exclusion, so that strong implementability
is immediate) provides an illustration.
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to an agent (hereafter “interacting with the agent”) or excluding the agent by making him
choose the outside option y0 = 0.
The agents’ utilities are given by




φ0(2, 1, v) = 2− v φ0(2, 0, v0) = −2v,
and hence u(1) = u(2) = 0. The principal’s utility is given by
π0(1, 1, v) = b+ v π0(1, 0, v) = v
π0(2, 1, v) = v − c π0(2, 0, v0) = v,
so that π = 0. The parameter b > 0 is a benefit the principal obtains from interacting with
an agent of type 1 and c > 0 is a corresponding cost of interacting with an agent of type 2.
Now suppose that the principal’s optimum involves interacting with agent 1 and excluding
agent 2, as will be the case whenever both b and c are sufficiently large. Then the optimal
tariff is v(1) = 2/3 = −v(0). Hence, the principal pays agent 2 to stay out of the market.
6 Single Crossing
For unidimensional principal-agent models in which the agent’s utility function is quasilinear,
assuming the agent’s willingness to pay to be strictly supermodular leads to a sharp
characterization of (strongly) implementable assignments: an assignment is (strongly)
implementable if and only if it is increasing (Rochet (1987), also see Vohra (2011, Theorem
4.2.5)). Similarly, for unidimensional matching models with perfectly transferable utility,
assuming that the surplus function is strictly supermodular implies that all stable full
matches feature positive assortative matching (Becker, 1973).
In this section we show that these results carry over to our setting with imperfectly
transferable utility. The only change required is to replace the assumption of strict super-
modularity with the assumption that the generating function satisfies a strict single crossing
condition.
Assumption 4. The sets X and Y are compact intervals in R. The generating function φ
satisfies the strict single crossing condition:
φ(x1, y2, v2) ≥ φ(x1, y1, v1) =⇒ φ(x2, y2, v2) > φ(x2, y1, v1) (40)
for all x1 < x2 ∈ X, y1 < y2 ∈ Y , and v1, v2 ∈ R.
A quasilinear generating function φ(x, y, v) = f(x, y)− v satisfies the strict single crossing
condition if and only if f(x, y) is strictly supermodular.32
32Under quasilinearity, the strict single crossing condition (40) becomes
f(x1, y2)− f(x1, y1) ≥ v2 − v1 =⇒ f(x2, y2)− f(x2, y1) > v2 − v1.
This is obviously implied by the strict supermodularity condition f(x2, y2)− f(x2, y1) > f(x1, y2)− f(x1, y1),
while choosing v2 − v1 = f(x1, y2)− f(x1, y1) ensures that strict single crossing implies supermodularity.
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We begin by considering matching models satisfying Assumption 4 and then show how the
results obtained for this case can be leveraged into a corresponding result for implementable
assignments. The results we obtain generalize previous results for principal-agent models
without quasilinear preferences by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) and for matching models
with imperfectly transferable utility by Legros and Newman (2007). The former impose
a smoothness condition on the generating function and restrict attention to piecewise
continuously differentiable assignments. The latter consider a model with a finite number of
agents and show that their generalized increasing differences condition, which is equivalent
to our strict single crossing condition, ensures that stable matches are positive assortative.
6.1 Positive Assortative Matching
We consider balanced matching models (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) satisfying Assumptions 1 and 4.
Given that X and Y are compact intervals in the reals it will be convenient to identify the
measures µ, ν, and λ with their distribution functions, denoted by Fµ, Gν , and Hλ. Let λ
∗
be the unique match satisfying
Hλ∗(x, y) = min{Fµ(x), Gν(y)} for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y. (41)
Following Galichon (2016, Chapter 4) we refer to λ∗ as the positive assortative match.
When both Fµ and Gν are continuous and strictly increasing, the positive assortative
match is obtained by matching each agent with his or her uniquely determined counterpart
on the other side of the market who has the same “rank” in the type distribution (as
determined by the quantile functions F−1 and G−1). Note that, in general, the positive
assortative match need not be deterministic but will be so when µ is atomless (Galichon,
2016, Lemma 4.2). This provides us with the condition in the following proposition ensuring
that the pairwise stable match is not only unique but also deterministic.
Proposition 12. Let Assumptions 1 and 4 hold and the matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v)
be balanced. Then the positive assortative match λ∗ is the unique pairwise stable match for
all initial conditions (x1, u1). Further, if µ is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue
measure, then λ∗ is deterministic.
Proof. Proposition 6 ensures that there exists a pairwise stable outcome (λ,u,v) with u
and v implementing each other and satisfying the initial condition (x1, u1).
Suppose the set Γu,v is comonotonic, that is, for (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) ∈ Γu,v we have
x2 > x1 ⇒ y2 ≥ y1 and y2 > y1 ⇒ x2 ≥ x1. Proposition 5.1 then implies that supp (λ) is
comonotonic. From Theorem 3 in Dhaene, Denuit, Goovaerts, Kaas, and Vyncke (2002),
λ then satisfies (41) and therefore is the positive assortative match λ∗. If µ is absolutely
continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, then Fµ is continuous and λ
∗ is deterministic
(Galichon, 2016, Lemma 4.2).
It remains to verify that the strict single crossing condition (40) in Assumption 4 implies
that Γu,v is comonotonic. It suffices to show that there does not exist (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ Γu,v
satisfying x2 > x1 and y1 > y2. To show this, observe that (because v implements u) from
Lemma 2 we have that (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ Γu,v implies
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φ(x1, y1,v(y1)) ≥ φ(x1, y2,v(y2))
φ(x2, y2,v(y2)) ≥ φ(x2, y1,v(y1)).
With x2 > x1 and y1 > y2, the first of these inequalities and (40) imply φ(x2, y1,v(y1)) >
φ(x2, y2,v(y2)), contradicting the second inequality.
Extending Proposition 12 to show that the unique pairwise stable match λ∗ is also the
unique stable match requires the existence of a pairwise stable outcome (λ∗,u,v) satisfying
the participation constraints u ≥ u and v ≥ v. This isn’t guaranteed. For an extreme
counterexample, it may be that there is no pair of agents capable of generating individually
rational payoffs (that is, u(x) > φ(x, y,v(y)) holds for all (x, y)), obviously implying that
in the unique stable outcome all agents are unmatched. Suppose, however, that for all
(x, y) ∈ X × Y , we have
u(x) < φ(x, y,v(y)) (42)
and consider a stable outcome (λ,u,v). If there were unmatched types in Y (that is,
supp (ν − λY ) 6= ∅), then we could conclude from (26) that there exists ŷ ∈ supp (ν) such
that v(ŷ) = v(ŷ) holds. Using (29) and (42) this implies u(x) > u(x) for all x ∈ supp (µ),
which in turn implies (from (25)) that there exist no unmatched types in X (that is,
supp (µ − λX) = ∅). As in a balanced match there are no matches featuring a strictly
positive measure of unmatched agents on one side of the market but not on the other, we
may thus conclude that λ is a full match. As every stable outcome featuring a full match is
also pairwise stable, Proposition 12 then implies:
Corollary 9. Let Assumptions 1 and 4 hold, let the matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) be
balanced and let (42) hold. Then the positive assortative match λ∗ is the unique stable match.
Similar arguments, though with more tedious notation, show that if Assumptions 1 and
4 hold, then in any stable match, all matched agents are matched positive assortatively.
6.2 Increasing Assignments
It is a familiar result that implementable assignments must be increasing if a strict single
crossing condition holds (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Theorem 7.2, p. 260). Therefore,
the main challenge in proving the following result is to show that every increasing assignment
can be implemented with any initial condition. To obtain this, we build on Proposition 12
to show that for every increasing assignment the deterministic match associated with it can
arise as the unique pairwise stable match in a suitably defined matching model.
Proposition 13. Let Assumptions 1 and 4 hold. Then an assignment y is implementable
if and only if it is increasing. In addition, every implementable assignment is strongly
implementable.
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Proof. Suppose the assignment y is implementable. Then there exist u and v implementing
each other, such that (x,y(x)) ∈ Γu,v holds for all x ∈ X (Proposition 4.1). Because Γu,v is
comonotonic (cf. the proof of Proposition 12), this implies that y is increasing.
Fix an increasing assignment y and an initial condition (x1, u1). We construct a balanced
matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v): Let µ be the restriction of Lebesgue measure on X to
the Borel sets, and let ν be the pushforward of µ through y (which is well-defined because
an increasing function y is measurable). The reservation utilities u and v will play no role,
and so we can take u ≡ 0 ≡ v.
Let λ∗ denote the positive assortative match for the matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v).
From Proposition 12, λ∗ is deterministic, and we have λ∗ = λy. Applying Proposition 12,
we obtain that there exists (u,v) such that (λy,u,v) is a pairwise stable outcome with
u(x1) = u1. From Proposition 6 we may take u and v to implement each other.
We complete the argument by showing that v implements (u,y). It suffices to show
that for every x ∈ X, (x,y(x)) ∈ Γu,v (Proposition 4). From Proposition 5.1, we have
supp(λy) ⊆ Γu,v. Fix a value x ∈ X. If y is continuous at x, then we immediately have
(x,y(x)) ∈ supp(λy) (since otherwise λy(X̃ × Y ) = 0 for some neighborhood X̃ of x, a
contradiction). If y is not continuous at x, then the increasing function y must take an
upward jump at x, and we have (x,y(x)) ∈ [limx̃↗x y(x), limx̃↘x y(x)] ⊆ Γu,v. The final
inclusion follows from the facts that for each y′ ∈ [limx̃↗x y(x), limx̃↘x y(x)] there exists
x′ ∈ X such that (x′, y′) ∈ Γu,v (because, from Lemma 2, Γu,v coincides with the graph of
the argmax-correspondence Yv, which is non-empty valued) and that Γu,v is comonotonic
(cf. the proof of Proposition 12), which implies x′ = x.
Recall from Section 2.4 that in the absence of quasilinearity an assignment may be imple-
mentable without being strongly implementable. Proposition 13 shows that strict crossing
precludes this possibility. It follows that strict single crossing is a sufficient condition for the
participation constraint to bind in any solution to the principal-agent model (Proposition
10).
Remark 9 (Single Crossing vs. Strict Single Crossing). Say that the generating function
satisfies the single crossing condition if the final inequality in (40) is weak. Under this
weaker condition there may be (pairwise) stable matches that are different from the positive
assortative match λ∗ and non-increasing assignments may be implementable (as can be
easily see by considering the trivial quasilinear example in which the generating function
is given by φ(x, y, v) = −v). However, under otherwise identical assumptions it remains
true that in a balanced matching model the positive assortative match λ∗ is pairwise stable
for all initial conditions, that every balanced matching model satisfying condition (42)
has a stable outcome featuring the match λ∗, and that every increasing assignment y is
strongly implementable. Proving this is more tedious under single crossing than under strict
single crossing as an extra step is required in the proof of Proposition 12 to show that the




Strong implementability has appeared in our analysis in several places. This section first
offers a condition that generalizes quasilinearity and suffices for strong implementability. We
then touch briefly on two extensions of the analysis, and offer some concluding comments.
7.1 A Sufficient Condition for Strong Implementability
The absence of income effects under quasilinear preferences leads immediately to the trans-
lational invariance noted in Section 2.4, which in turn implies strong implementability. A
weaker form of translational invariance suffices to obtain the conclusion of strong imple-
mentability of all implementable assignments. Specifically, consider a generating function
satisfying Assumption 1. Fix any type x0 ∈ X and any profile v. Then for any t0 ∈ R we can
find a uniquely determined profile v̂ such that φ(x0, y,v(y))−φ(x0, y, v̂(y)) = t0 holds for all
y ∈ Y . The optimal decisions of type x0 when maximizing again the tariff v are then identical
to the optimal decisions when maximizing against v̂. Further, the same will be true for any
other type x1 ∈ X provided that there exists t1 such that φ(x1, y,v(y))− φ(x1, y, v̂(y)) = t1
holds for all y. Therefore, every implementable assignment is strongly implementable if the
generating function satisfies for any x0, x1, y and y
′ and for any v, v′, v̂ and v̂′,
[φ(x0, y, v)− φ(x0, y′, v′)] = [φ(x0, y, v̂)− φ(x0, y′, v̂′)]
⇒ (43)
[φ(x1, y, v)− φ(x1, y′, v′)] = [φ(x1, y, v̂)− φ(x1, y′, v̂′)].
Condition (43) ensures more than strong implementability. It also implies that (as in the
quasilinear case) every match λ that is pairwise stable for some initial condition is pairwise
stable for all initial conditions. This is so because, under condition (43), moving from a tariff
v to any “translated tariff” v̂ leaves the argmax-correspondence unchanged: supp(λ) ∈ ΓΦv,v
implies supp(λ) ∈ ΓΦv̂,v̂.
We note that condition (43) embodies no restriction on the preferences of a single agent
type x0 over (y, v) pairs beyond the weak regularity properties implied by Assumption 1, and
hence allows arbitrary income effects. Rather, condition (43) imposes a restriction across
types, demanding that whatever change in tariff is required to preserve all utility differences
for one type will also preserve all utility differences for any other type. Condition (43) holds,
of course, if the characteristic function is quasilinear. More generally, it is satisfied if the
characteristic function takes the form φ(x, y, v) = f(x, y)− h(y, v).
7.2 Stochastic Contracts in the Principal-Agent Model
In the principal-agent model with quasilinear utility it is well-known that the principal
may benefit from offering stochastic rather then deterministic contracts to screen different
agent types (cf. Strausz, 2006, for extensive discussion). In general, a stochastic contract
corresponds to an incentive compatible direct mechanism which specifies, for every type of
the agent, a lottery over transfers and decisions. To explain how stochastic contracts can be
embedded in our model, it will be easier to begin with the case in which transfers are taken
to be deterministic.
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Fix a principal-agent model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν, π,u) satisfying Assumptions 1 and 3 and let
∆Y be the set of probability measures over the set Y , with typical element ζ. We equip the
set ∆Y with the topology of weak convergence, and note that ∆Y is then a compact metric
space (with the Prokhorov metric).
We can then extend the definitions of the payoff functions by taking the appropriate
expectations:








thereby obtaining a principal-agent model (X,∆Y, φ∆, µ, π∆,u) in which the set of possible
decisions is given by ∆Y rather than Y and a tariff assigns a transfer to every probability
measure ζ ∈ ∆Y rather than to every decision y. This extended principal-agent model
satisfies Assumptions 1 and 3.33 Consequently, our version of the taxation principle (Remark
1) as well as all the results from Section 5 continue to hold.
If both φ and π are quasilinear, then the restriction to deterministic transfers is without
loss of generality, as both the agent’s and the principal’s preferences only depend on the
expected transfer. In the general case this is not so, raising the question whether we can
incorporate stochastic transfers in our model. That we can do so is not immediately obvious
because the duality theory developed in Sections 2 and 3 of this paper hinges on a tariff being
a map into the real numbers. However, while doing so would be redundant for deterministic
contracts, there is nothing in the formal structure of the model which prevents us from
supposing that decisions y include the specification of a monetary transfer.34 Therefore, the
33We have already noted that ∆Y is a compact metric space. It is obvious that φ∆ and π∆ inherit the
requisite monotonicity properties and the full range condition from φ and π. Continuity is less obvious. From
the definition of weak convergence and the fact that for fixed x and v, the function φ(x, y, v) : Y → R is
continuous on a compact set, we can conclude that if the sequence (ζn)
∞






φ(x, y, v)dζ(y). (44)
This in turn implies that φ∆ is continuous: Suppose we have a sequence (xn, ζn, vn)
∞
n=1 converging to (x, ζ, v)
(pointwise in the first and third arguments, and in the sense of weak convergence in the second). Notice that
the set {vn}∞n=1 is contained in a compact subset R̃ of R. Then for any ε, there exists a sufficiently large N



































where the first appearance of ε/2 follows from (44) and the second follows from the uniform continuity of the
function φ on the compact set X × Y × R̃. A similar argument applies to establish continuity of π∆.
34For example, let q ∈ [0, q̄] be the quantity of some good. Ordinarily, we would take Y = [0, q̄] and then
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same construction that we have described above—replacing the set Y by the set ∆Y—allows
us to introduce stochastic transfers into the model with the only salient restriction being
that any randomization over payments that comes on top of the deterministic transfer v is
restricted to a compact set of probability distributions.
7.3 Moral Hazard in the Principal-Agent Model
We have considered adverse-selection principal-agent models. Following Myerson (1982),
Laffont and Tirole (1993), Laffont and Martimort (2002, Section 7.1), Kadan, Reny, and
Swinkels (2017) and others, one might extend the model to encompass moral hazard. The
recipe for incorporating moral hazard is similar to that for stochastic contracts. We offer a
simple illustration.
Suppose the agent must choose an effort level e ∈ [0, 1] that induces a probability mass
function f(z, e) with support on the finite set Z, from which an output z is realized. The
principal cannot observe the agent’s effort. Once again, we can view the agent as choosing
a decision y and paying a transfer v(y) to the principal. A decision y now is a function
w : Z → [w,w] identifying, for each output level z, the wage w(z) ∈ [w,w] paid by the
principal to the agent if output z is realized. The agent’s utility from wage w, output z, effort
level e and transfer v is given by u(x, e, w − v), while the principal’s utility is z − (w − v).
The set X is again a compact set of agent types. We take the set Y to be the set of
functions w : Z → [w,w]. Then we let




u(x, e,w(z)− v)f(z, e).
We let E(x,w) be the set of maximizers of this problem, and let the principal’s utility be




(z − (w(z)− v))f(z, e).
Assuming that u and f are continuous, it follows from Berge’s maximum theorem that
φ is continuous, and hence Assumption 1 is satisfied. The function π(x,w, v) is upper
semicontinuous. We would again have Assumptions 1 and 3 satisfied, except that the
function π is only semicontinuous. However, this suffices for an argument analogous to that
of Section 5.
One might want to generalize this illustration in many ways, including allowing an
infinite set of possible outputs and relaxing the bounds on the function w. Our results will
apply as long as attention is restricted to circumstances in which the set Y can reasonably
be taken to be compact.
suppose that a monopolistic seller (the principal) with utility function π(x, q, v) designs a tariff specifying
payments v(q) for all possible quantities that a consumer (the agent) with preferences described by the utility
function φ(x, q, v) might want to buy. Instead, we may take Ŷ = [0, q̄]× [0, t̄] and suppose that the seller prices
bundles (q, t) ∈ Y , consisting of a quantity q of the good and a rebate t ∈ [0, t̄] that the consumer receives
if he buys the bundle (q, t) at price v(q, t). Setting φ̂(x, y, v) = φ(x, q, v − t) and π̂(x, y, v) = π(x, q, v − t)
for y = (q, t) then yields a principal-agent model (X, Ŷ , φ̂, µ, π̂,u) that satisfies Assumption 1 and 3 if the
original model (X,Y, φ, µ, π,u) does so and describes the same underlying economic environment.
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7.4 Conclusion
We have introduced and studied a duality relationship that provides a characterization of
implementable profiles and assignments suitable for adverse-selection principal-agent models
and two-sided matching models. This has allowed us to extend results previously developed
for the quasilinear case, and to clarify the logic behind these results.
Throughout our analysis we have eschewed smoothness assumptions, as these play no role
for the duality structure and are not required for the existence and characterization results
pursued here. However, much of the power of conjugate duality stems from the inherent
smoothness properties of convex functions, and many of the more useful implications of
generalized conjugate duality for the quasilinear case—ranging from the familiar integral
representation of implementable utility profile (e.g. Myerson, 1979) to results asserting
the uniqueness and determinateness of stable matchings (e.g. Chiappori, McCann, and
Nesheim, 2010)—require smoothness conditions. Adding such conditions to our Assumption
1 opens the possibility to investigate questions that go beyond those addressed in this paper.
For instance, McCann and Zhang (2017) use the implementation duality to show how the
conditions from Figalli, Kim, and McCann (2011), under which the principal’s problem
can be reduced to a convex maximization program, can be extended to the non-quasilinear
case. We also believe that (under suitable differentiability assumptions) it will be possible
to extend the type-assignment approach developed in Nöldeke and Samuelson (2007), which
rests on the inverse relationship between a pair of profiles implementing each other and
their associated argmax-correspondences, to characterize optimal bunches in principal-agent
models satisfying the strict single crossing condition.
A number of extensions suggest themselves. First, much is known about the structure of
the set of stable outcomes in matching models with a finite number of agents (Roth and
Sotomayor, 1990, Chapter 9), including connectedness and comparative static properties,
that one might want to extend to the current setting. Second, as suggested by our discussion
of stochastic contracts and moral-hazard in the principal-agent model, our compactness
assumption on Y is sometimes restrictive because it is natural to allow for unbounded Y .
Similarly, the assumption that the type space X is compact is violated in some applications in
finance (such as Glosten, 1989) in which normally distributed types are considered.35 Third,
the implementation relationships studied here also appear in economic contexts different from
the ones we have considered, with possible applications ranging from the characterization of
hedonic pricing equilibria (cf. Chiappori, McCann, and Nesheim, 2010, in the quasilinear
case) to the development of new econometric techniques for discrete-choice random-utility
models (Bonnet, Galichon, and Shum, 2017). Finally, while Galois connections have played
little role in economic theory so far, their appearance in the study of information aggregation
(under the guise of a residual mapping) in Chambers and Miller (2011) and in the study of
preference aggregation (Monjardet, 1978, 2007), suggest that further applications may by
found in areas far removed from the implementation duality.
35In the quasilinear case Bardsley (2017) provides an illuminating duality-based analysis of principal-agent
models that avoids compactness assumptions.
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Appendix
A.1 Implementability and Direct Mechanisms
Let RX be the set of functions from X to R. Then (u,y) ∈ RX × Y X (note that here u is
not required to be bounded) is implementable by an incentive compatible direct mechanism
if there exists t ∈ RX such that the feasibility conditions u(x) = φ(x,y(x), t(x)) and the
incentive compatibility conditions φ(x,y(x), t(x)) ≥ φ(x,y(x̂), t(x̂)) hold for all x, x̂ ∈ X.
Similarly, letting RY be the set of functions from Y to R, we may define (v,x) ∈ RY ×XY
to be implementable by an incentive compatible direct mechanism if there exists t ∈ RY
such that v(y) = ψ(y,x(y), t(y)) and ψ(y,x(y), t(y)) ≥ ψ(y,x(ŷ), t(ŷ)) hold for all y, ŷ ∈ Y .
Lemma 7. Let Assumption 1 hold.
[7.1] (u,y) ∈ RX × Y X is implementable by an incentive compatible direct mechanism if
and only if u ∈ B(X) and there exists v ∈ B(Y ) implementing (u,y).
[7.2] (v,x) ∈ RY ×XY is implementable by an incentive compatible direct mechanism if
and only if v ∈ B(Y ) and there exists u ∈ B(X) implementing (v,x).
Proof of Lemma 7. We prove Lemma 7.1; the proof of Lemma 7.2 is analogous.
It is immediate from the revelation principle that if (u,y) ∈ B(X)× Y X is implemented
by v ∈ B(Y ) then (u,y) is implementable by an incentive compatible direct mechanism.
Indeed, upon setting t(x) = v(y(x)) for all x ∈ X, conditions (3) and (4) imply u(x) =
φ(x,y(x), t(x)) ≥ φ(x,y(x̂), t(x̂)) for all x, x̂ ∈ X.
Conversely, suppose that (u,y) ∈ RX ×Y X is implementable by an incentive compatible
direct mechanism, so that there exists t ∈ RX such that
u(x) = φ(x,y(x), t(x)) ≥ φ(x,y(x̂), t(x̂)) (45)
t(x) = ψ(y(x), x,u(x)) ≥ ψ(y(x), x̂,u(x̂)) (46)
hold for all x, x̂ ∈ X, where the equality in (46) follows from (45) because φ and ψ are
inverse and the inequality in (46) follows from (45) upon reversing the roles of x and x̂ in
the inequality u(x) ≥ φ(x,y(x̂), t(x̂)) and using, again, that φ and ψ are inverse.
First, we establish that u is bounded. Fix x̂ ∈ X. The inequality in (45) ensure that for
all x ∈ X,
u(x) ≥ φ(x,y(x̂), t(x̂)) ≥ min
x̃∈X
φ(x̃,y(x̂), t(x̂)) =: u ∈ R,
where the minimum u exists because X is compact and φ continuous. Next, using (46) we
have,
t(x) = ψ(y(x), x,u(x)) ≥ ψ(y(x), x̂,u(x̂)) ≥ min
y∈Y
ψ(y, x̂,u(x̂)) =: t ∈ R,
for all x ∈ X, where the minimum t exists because Y is compact and ψ continuous. Using
the equality in (45) and that φ is strictly decreasing in its third argument, we then have, for
all x ∈ X,
u(x) = φ(x,y(x), t(x)) ≤ φ(x,y(x), t) ≤ max
x̃∈X,ỹ∈Y
φ(x̃, ỹ, t) =: u ∈ R,
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where the maximum u exists because X and Y are compact and φ continuous. We thus
have u ≤ u(x) ≤ u for all x ∈ X, which implies u ∈ B(X). From the equality in (46), t is
bounded, too.
Second, we show there exists v ∈ B(Y ) implementing (u,y). We can fix a value v ∈ R
such that φ(x, y, v) ≤ u holds for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y . Now let
v(y) =
{
t(x) if y = y(x) for some x ∈ X
v otherwise.
If there exist x, x̂ ∈ X and y ∈ Y with y = y(x) = y(x̂), then the incentive constraints
in (45) imply t(x) = t(x̂). Therefore v(y) is well-defined for all y ∈ Y and, because t is
bounded, we have v ∈ B(Y ). Finally, using (45), it is immediate from the construction of v
that we have
u(x) = φ(x,y(x),v(y(x))) ≥ φ(x, y,v(y))
for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y , so that v implements (u,y).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
First, we prove the continuity of Ψ : B(X)→ B(Y ). The argument for the continuity of
Φ : B(Y )→ B(X) is analogous.
Fix u ∈ B(X) and ε > 0. We have to establish that there exists δ > 0 such that
‖ũ− u‖ < δ =⇒ ‖Ψũ−Ψu‖ < ε.
Let (the following expressions are well-defined because u is bounded) z̄ = supx∈X u(x)+1,
z = infx∈X u(x)− 1, and Z = [z, z̄] ⊂ R. For every δ ∈ (0, 1) and x ∈ X, we then have
‖ũ− u‖ < δ =⇒ ũ(x) ∈ Z.
As ψ is continuous, it is uniformly continuous on the compact set X × Y × Z. Hence, there
exists δ ∈ (0, 1) and ε′ ∈ (0, ε) such that
‖ũ− u‖ < δ =⇒| ψ(y, x, ũ(x))− ψ(y, x,u(x)) |< ε′
for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . We also have





ψ(y, x, ũ(x))− sup
x∈X
ψ(y, x,u(x))
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε′ < ε,
which gives ‖Ψũ−Ψu‖ < ε, as desired.
Second, let V ⊂ B(Y ) be bounded, ensuring the existence of a compact interval Z ⊂ R
such that v(Y ) ⊂ Z holds for all v ∈ V . We then have Φv(x) ∈ [min(x,y,v)∈X×Y×Z φ(x, y, v),
max(x,y,v)∈X×Y×Z φ(x, y, v)] for all x ∈ X and v ∈ V , ensuring that ΦV ⊂ B(X) is bounded.
The argument for Ψ is analogous.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
It is immediate from the definitions that I(X) ⊆ ΦB(Y ). Hence, to establish the first
statement in (13) we need to show that the image Φv of any profile v ∈ B(Y ) is implementable
and continuous. The remaining statement in (13) follows by an analogous argument.
Given any profile v ∈ B(Y ), let sv = supy∈Y v(y) denote its supremum and iv =
infy∈Y v(y) its infimum. These are finite because v is bounded. Let Ev = {(y, v) ∈ Y × R |
v ≥ v(y)} denote the epigraph of v, and let Zv = {(y, v) ∈ Y ×R | sv ≥ v ≥ v(y)}. Observe
that the set Zv ⊂ Ev is bounded, contains the graph of v and is contained in [iv, sv]× Y ,
which is a compact set (because Y is compact).
Lemma 8. Let Assumption 1 hold. If a profile v ∈ B(Y ) is lower semicontinuous, then
it implements Φv, Φv is continuous, and the argmax correspondence Yv is nonempty- and
compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous. Analogously, if a profile u ∈ B(X) is lower
semicontinuous, then it implements Ψu, Ψu is continuous, and the argmax correspondence
Xu is nonempty- and compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous.
Proof of Lemma 8. If v ∈ B(Y ) is lower semicontinuous, then its epigraph Ev is closed
and so is Zv. As Zv is contained in the compact set [iv, sv]×Y it follows that Zv is compact.
As the generating function φ is continuous, a solution to the problem
max
(y,v)∈Zv
φ(x, y, v) (47)
thus exists for all x ∈ X by Weierstrass’ extreme value theorem. As φ is continuous and
Zv is compact, it follows from Berge’s maximum theorem (Ok, 2007, p. 306) that the
profile u ∈ B(X) defined by u(x) = max(y,v)∈Zv φ(x, y, v) for all x ∈ X is continuous and
the correspondence mapping X into argmax(y,v)∈Zv φ(x, y, v) is compact valued and upper
hemicontinuous.




φ(x, y, v) ≥ φ(x, y,v(y)) ∀x ∈ X and y ∈ Y.
On the other hand, because φ is strictly decreasing in its third argument any solution to
(47) lies on the graph of v, implying that for every x ∈ X, there exists y(x) ∈ Y such that
max
(y,v)∈Zv
φ(x, y, v) = φ(x,y(x),v(y(x)))
holds. This ensures that the suprema in the definition of Φv are attained and that v imple-
ments Φv = u. Finally, the compact-valuedness and upper hemicontinuity of Yv are implied
by the same properties of the correspondence mapping X into argmax(y,v)∈Zv φ(x, y, v).
Continuation of the Proof of Proposition 2. It remains to consider the case in which
v ∈ B(Y ) is not lower semicontinuous. Let v̄ be the lower semicontinuous hull of v, i.e., the
greatest element of the family of lower semicontinuous functions from Y to R majorized by
v.36 (The existence of v̄ is assured, cf. Penot (2013, Proposition 1.21).) As v is bounded,
36The lower semicontinuous hull of a function is also known as its lsc regularization or its lower closure
(Rockafellar and Wets, 1998, p. 14).
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so is v̄, i.e., we have v̄ ∈ B(Y ). From Lemma 8 the profile v̄ implements Φv̄, which is
continuous. It remains to show that Φv̄ = Φv holds. Because the epigraph Ev̄ of v̄ is the
closure of the epigraph Ev of v (Penot, 2013, Proposition 1.21), we have that Zv̄ is the
closure of Zv. Therefore,
sup
(y,v)∈Zv
φ(x, y, v) = max
(y,v)∈Zv̄
φ(x, y, v)
and thus (because φ is decreasing in its third argument) we have supy∈Y φ(x, y,v(y)) =
maxy∈Y φ(x, y, v̄(y)) for all x ∈ X, which is the desired result.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 3
We prove Corollary 3.1; 3.2 is analogous. First, if Ψu implements (u,y), then (u,y) is
implementable by definition.
Second, let (u,y) ∈ B(X)×Y X be implementable. Then u implements Ψu (Corollary 2).
It remains to show that Ψu implements (u,y). As Ψu is implementable, it implements ΦΨu
(Corollary 2). Proposition 3.1 gives u = ΦΨu, so that we have shown that Ψu implements
u. To show that Ψu also implements y, we proceed as follows:
As (u,y) is implementable there exists ṽ ∈ B(Y ) implementing it, thus satisfying
u = Φṽ, from which we obtain Ψu = ΨΦṽ. From the first inequality in (10) in Corollary
1.1, we have ṽ ≥ ΨΦṽ and thus ṽ ≥ Ψu. Now suppose that Ψu does not implement y.
Because Ψu implements u there then exists (x̂, ŷ) ∈ X × Y such that
u(x̂) = φ(x̂, ŷ,Ψu(ŷ)) > φ(x̂,y(x̂),Ψu(y(x̂))) ≥ φ(x̂,y(x̂), ṽ(y(x̂))),
where the last inequality uses ṽ ≥ Ψu and the assumption that φ is decreasing in its third
argument. But because ṽ implements (u,y) we also have
u(x̂) = φ(x̂,y(x̂)), ṽ(y(x̂))),
resulting in a contradiction which finishes the proof.
A.5 Proof of (18)–(19) in Remark 6
We prove (19); (18) is analogous. First, suppose the profile v ∈ B(Y ) is implementable.
Then v implements and is implemented by u = Φv (Corollary 3), implying that both Xu
and Yv are nonempty valued. Further, from Lemma 2 the correspondences are inverses of
each other, and hence must be onto.
Second, suppose that Yv is nonempty valued and onto. Then v implements the profile
u = Φv (because Yv is nonempty valued) and for all ŷ ∈ Y there exists x̂ ∈ X such that
u(x̂) = φ(x̂, ŷ,v(ŷ)) holds (because Yv is onto), which is equivalent to v(ŷ) = ψ(ŷ, x̂,u(x̂)).
As v implements u we have u(x) ≥ φ(x, ŷ,v(ŷ)) for all x ∈ X, which is equivalent to
v(ŷ) ≥ ψ(ŷ, x,u(x)) for all x ∈ X. Combining the equality and the inequality for v(ŷ) we
have v(ŷ) = maxx∈X φ(ŷ, x,u(x)). As this holds for all ŷ ∈ Y , it follows that u implements
v, so that v is implementable.
44
A.6 Proof of Corollary 4.
We prove statements [4.1]–[4.3], with the proofs of the corresponding statements for I(Y )
being analogous.
[4.1] Consider a sequence (un)
∞
n=1 of profiles in I(X) converging to some u
∗ ∈ B(X).
We want to show that u∗ is implementable. For all n ∈ N, let vn = Ψun. Because Ψ is
continuous (Lemma 1), the sequence (vn)
∞
n=1 converges to v
∗ = Ψu∗. Corollary 3.1 implies
that vn implements un, so that we have un = Φvn for all n ∈ N . Taking limits on both
sides of this equation and using the continuity of Φ (Lemma 1), we obtain u∗ = Φv∗. From
Proposition 2 this establishes the implementability of u∗, and hence that I(X) is closed.
Next, suppose that the sequence (un)
∞
n=1 is in Uy ⊂ I(X). With the same construction of
the sequence (vn)
∞
n=1 as above, Corollary 3.1 then implies that vn implements y for all n, so
that
φ(x,y(x),vn(y(x)) ≥ φ(x, y,vn(y))
holds for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y and n ∈ N. As the (uniform) convergence of (vn)∞n=1 to v∗ implies
its pointwise convergence to the same limit and φ is continuous, the above inequalities imply
φ(x,y(x),v∗(y(x)) ≥ φ(x, y,v∗(y))
for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . Therefore, v∗ implements y. As v∗ also implements u∗, this
establishes u∗ ∈ Uy.
[4.2] Let U ⊂ I(X) be bounded. Fix ε > 0. To show equicontinuity of U , we establish
that there exists δ > 0 such that
‖x̂− x‖ < δ =⇒ ‖u(x̂)− u(x)‖ < ε (48)
for all x̂, x ∈ X and u ∈ U .
Because U is bounded, so is V = ΨU (Lemma 1). We may then choose v < v̄ ∈ R such
that v ∈ V implies v ≤ v(y) ≤ v̄ for all y ∈ Y . Because φ is continuous, it is uniformly
continuous on the compact set X × Y × [v, v̄]. Consequently, there exists δ > 0 such that
‖x̂− x‖ < δ =⇒ ‖φ(x̂, y, v)− φ(x, y, v)‖ < ε (49)
for all (y, v) ∈ Y × [v, v̄]. Fix such a δ and let ‖x̂− x‖ < δ hold.
Consider any u ∈ U . From Corollary 3, the profile v = Ψu ∈ V implements u. Let
ỹ ∈ Yv(x) and ŷ ∈ Yv(x̂). We then have
u(x) =φ(x, ỹ,v(ỹ)) ≥ φ(x, ŷ,v(ŷ)),
u(x̂) =φ(x̂, ŷ,v(ŷ)) ≥ φ(x̂, ỹ,v(ỹ)),
implying
ε > φ(x̂, ŷ,v(ŷ))− φ(x, ŷ,v(ŷ)) ≥ u(x̂)− u(x) ≥ φ(x̂, ỹ,v(ỹ))− φ(x, ỹ,v(ỹ)) > −ε,
where the outer inequalities are from (49) and the fact that v ≤ v(y) ≤ v̄ holds for all y ∈ Y .
Consequently, we have ‖u(x̂)− u(x)‖ < ε, thus establishing (48).
[4.3] This follows from Corollary 4.2 and an application of the Arzela-Ascoli theorem
(Ok, 2007, p. 264).
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A.7 Proof of Lemma 4
We prove Lemma 4.1; the proof for Lemma 4.2 is analogous.
Let U ⊂ I(X) be a closed sublattice of B(X) for which
Ux = {u ∈ U|u(x) = u(x)}.
is non-empty for all x ∈ X. For the current proof, the important observation is that if
y ∈ Y X is strongly implementable, then one such set is Uy, which is a subset of I(X) (by
definition), closed (Corollary 4.1), and, by Lemma 3, a sublattice of B(X), with the strong
implementability of y ensuring that {u ∈ Uy|u(x) = u(x)} is nonempty for all x ∈ X.
Let
S = {u ∈ U | u ≥ u}.
We proceed in two steps. The first step establishes that there exists û ∈ S satisfying
û(x) = u(x) for some x ∈ X. The second step then completes the argument by showing
that S has a minimal element.
Step 1: Pick an arbitrary x0 ∈ X and u0 in Ux0 (recalling that Ux is non-empty for all
x ∈ X). We construct a sequence (xn)∞n=1 in X and an associated sequence (un)∞n=1 of
profiles in U, satisfying un ∈ Uxn for all n, by the following recursion: Given (xn−1,un−1)
with un−1 ∈ Uxn−1 , let xn ∈ arg minx∈X [un−1(x)− u(x)]. Because both un−1 (as an
implementable profile) and u (by assumption) are continuous and X is compact, such an
xn exists. Pick any ûn ∈ Uxn . Define un = un−1 ∨ ûn. Because U is a sublattice, we then
have un ∈ U. Because un−1 ∈ Uxn−1 implies minx∈X [un−1(x)− u(x)] ≤ 0, we further have
un(xn) = u(xn), implying un ∈ Uxn .
The sequence (un)
∞
n=1 is increasing by construction. It is also bounded above.
37 Therefore,
it is bounded and thus equicontinuous (Corollary 4.2). Hence, (un)
∞
n=1, which is a sequence
in the closed set U, has a limit point û ∈ U. Note that û is continuous because it is
implementable (Proposition 2).
Because X is compact, the sequence (xn)
∞
n=1 has a converging subsequence, denoted
by xnk , with limit x
∗ ∈ X. As (un)∞n=1 is a sequence of continuous functions converging









As un(xn) = u(xn) holds for all n and u is continuous, (50) implies
û(x∗) = u(x∗). (52)
37By Assumption 1 and the continuity of the profile u, the profile v˜ ∈ B(Y ) given by v˜(y) =minx∈X ψ(y, x,u(x)) for all y ∈ Y is well-defined. For any profile v ∈ B(Y ) satisfying v(ŷ) < v˜(ŷ)for some ŷ ∈ Y , we have φ(x, ŷ,v(ŷ)) > u(x) for all x ∈ X by construction. For such v, u = Φv thus
satisfies u(x) > u(x) for all x ∈ X, implying that u is not in ∪x∈XUx. By the order reversal property of the
implementation map Φ it follows that u = Φv˜ is an upper bound for ∪x∈XUx and therefore an upper boundfor (un)∞n=1.
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By construction of the sequence (xn)
∞
n=1 we have
un−1(x)− u(x) ≥ un−1(xn)− u(xn)
for all x ∈ X and n ≥ 1. Taking limits for the sequence nk we thus obtain
û(x)− u(x) ≥ û(x∗)− u(x∗)
for all x ∈ X, where we have used the continuity of u and (51) to obtain the right side of
the inequality. Taking account of (52) this implies
û(x) ≥ u(x) (53)
for all x ∈ X. Combining (52) and (53), we have established the desired result.
Step 2: As S contains û satisfying û(x) = u(x) for some x ∈ X, it is immediate that a
minimum element u∗ of S must satisfy u∗(x) = u(x) for the same x ∈ X. It remains to
show that such a minimum element exists.
Given any ū ∈ S, let
Sū = {u ∈ U} | ū ≥ u ≥ u}.
The set Sū contains ū and hence is nonempty. Further, it is clearly bounded. As the
intersection of two closed sets, the set Sū is closed and as an intersection of two sublattices
of B(X), it is a sublattice. With the set Sū being a closed and bounded subset of I(X), it is
compact (Corollary 4.3) and thus a complete sublattice of B(X).38 The complete sublattice
Sū has a minimum element u
∗, which clearly is also the minimum element of S.
A.8 Stable Outcomes in Finite-Support Matching Models
We complete the argument from Remark 7. Let X = {x ∈ X | x = xi for some i ∈ I} and
Y = {y ∈ Y | y = yj for some j ∈ J} denote the supports of the type distributions in the
finite-support matching model. For x ∈ X let I(x) = {i ∈ I | xi = x} and for y ∈ Y let
J(y) = {j ∈ J | yj = y} Consider now a stable outcome (ρ, u1, . . . , um, v1, . . . , vn) for the
matching model with a finite number of agents. Let ũ and ṽ be arbitrary profiles in B(X)
and B(Y ). Given that equal treatment holds, setting
u(x) =
{





vj if y ∈ J(y)
ṽ otherwise
38The set Sū is compact in the norm topology. A lattice is complete if and only if it is compact in
the interval topology (Birkhoff, 1995, p. 250, Theorem 20). Compactness in the norm topology implies
compactness in the interval topology, as any set open under the latter is also open under the former.
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gives two well-defined profiles u ∈ B(X) and v ∈ B(Y ). The measure λ has support







With these definitions, it is straightforward to verify that (λ,u,v) is a stable outcome for
the finite-support matching model.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 5.3
Let (λ,u,v) be a pairwise stable outcome for the balanced matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v).
Let X ⊆ X and Y ⊆ Y be the supports of µ and ν. Noticing that supp(λ) ⊆ X × Y holds,
every pair of profiles ũ and ṽ that satisfy ũ = u on X and ṽ = v on Y satisfy (24) and
(29), implying that for any such pair (λ, ũ, ṽ) is a pairwise stable outcome. It thus suffices
to construct a pair of profiles satisfying ũ = u on X and ṽ = v on Y that implement each
other.
Because λ is a full match, for every x ∈ X there exists y ∈ Y with (x, y) ∈ supp(λ).
(Otherwise we would have λX(X̃) = 0 for some neighborhood X̃ of x, a contradiction.) By
(24) and (29) this implies that the restriction of the profile v to Y implements the restriction
of the profile u to X , that is,
u(x) = max
y∈Y
φ(x, y,v(y)), ∀x ∈ X .
Similarly, for every y ∈ Y there must exist x ∈ X with (x, y) ∈ supp(λ), so that (24) and
(29) imply that restriction of u to X implements the restriction of v to Y:
v(y) = max
x∈X
ψ(y, x,u(x)), ∀y ∈ Y.




This profile satisfies ũ = u on X (because the restriction of v to Y implements the restriction
of u to X ). Further, it is implementable. Indeed, because v is bounded for sufficiently large
v̆ any profile v̂ ∈ B(Y ) of the form
v̂(y) =
{
v(y) if y ∈ Y
v̆ otherwise
implements ũ. Now, let ṽ = Ψũ. As ũ is implementable, we then have that ũ and ṽ
implement each other (Proposition 3.1). It remains to show that ṽ = v holds on Y. But
this follows upon noting that ũ = u on X implies ṽ ≥ v on Y on the one hand (because the
restriction of u to X implements the restriction of v to Y) and on the other hand we have
ṽ = ΨΦv̂, which implies (from Corollary 1.1) v̂ ≥ ṽ and therefore, because v̂ = v on Y , the
inequality v ≥ ṽ on Y.
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A.10 Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose y is implementable and satisfies λ = λy. From Proposition 4.1, the implementability
of y implies that there exists u and v implementing each other such that the graph of y is
contained in Γu,v. As the argmax correspondence Yv is upper hemicontinuous (Corollary
2), its graph is closed. Hence, Γu,v, which coincides with the graph of Yv (Lemma 2), also
contains the closure of the graph of y. Moreover, the closure of the graph of y contains
the support of λy (otherwise, there is a point (x, y) with a neighborhood that does not
intersect the graph of y and which receives positive measure under λy, a contradiction to
the definition of λy in (32)). We thus have supp(λ) ⊆ Γu,v, implying that λ is pairwise
stable (Proposition 5.1 and 5.2).
Conversely, suppose the deterministic match λ is pairwise stable. From Proposition
5.3 the pairwise stability of λ implies that there exist (u,v) implementing each other such
that supp(λ) ⊆ Γu,v. By Proposition 4.1 it remains to show that there exists a measurable
assignment y with graph contained in Γu,v satisfying λy = λ. By definition of a deterministic
match, there exists a measurable assignment y′ such that λ = λy′ holds. If the graph of
y′ is contained in the support of λ, then we are done upon setting y = y′. It remains to
consider the case that the graph of y′ is not contained in the support of λ.
We construct the assignment y. Let X denote the support of µ. First, we note that
λy′ does not depend on the specification of y
′ outside the support of µ. In addition, it is
straightforward to define the assignment y on X \ X so that (x,y(x)) ∈ Γu,v holds for all
x ∈ X \ X .39 Now let X̃ = {x ∈ X | (x,y′(x)) 6∈ supp(λ)}. The set X̃ is negligible (that is,
contained in a subset of X with measure zero) by definition of λy′ . Hence, we can complete
the specification of y by taking y to equal a measurable selection from Yv (cf. footnote
39) (and hence (x,y(x)) ∈ Γu,v) on a subset of X that contains X̃ and has measure zero,
and taking y to equal y′ (and hence (x,y(x)) ∈ supp(λ) ⊆ Γu,v) on the remainder of X̃.
This construction ensures that the graph of y is contained in Γu,v. It follows immediately
from the definitions of λy and λy′ that we further have λy = λy′ . As λy′ = λ holds by
assumption, this implies λy = λ, finishing the proof.
A.11 Proof of Proposition 6
Let (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) be a balanced matching problem satisfying Assumption 1. Since this
matching model is balanced, nothing is lost (and some convenience is gained) by taking µ
and ν to be probability measures, which we hereafter maintain.
Let (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn and (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Y n satisfy y1 = y0, where y0 ∈ Y is the agent
appearing as part of the initial condition (y0, v0) in the statement of the Proposition. Define







39The properties of the correspondence Yv noted in Corollary 2 imply that this correspondence has a closed
graph, ensuring that it is weakly measurable (Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Theorem 18.20 and Lemma 18.2),
and hence has a measurable selection (Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Theorem 18.13) ỹ. Take y to equal ỹ on
X \ X .
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for all measurable Ỹ ⊆ Y .
Lemma 9. Let Assumption 1 hold. The matching model (X,Y, φ, µn, νn,u,v) has a pairwise
stable outcome (λn,un,vn) with profiles un and vn that implement each other and that satisfy
vn(y0) = v0.
Proof of Lemma 9. We first construct an auxiliary balanced finite-support matching
model (X,Y, φ, n ·µn, n ·νn,u˜,v˜) satisfying Assumption 1 by (i) multiplying the measures µnand νn by n (so as to convert them into counting measures) and (ii) replacing the reservation
utility profiles u and v by reservation utility profiles




v0 if y = y0
u otherwise,
where u is sufficiently small as to ensure φ(x, y, u) > φ(x, y0, v0) > u for all x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y .
Consider the matching model with a finite number of agents associated with (X,Y, φ, n ·
µn, n · νn,u˜,v˜) (cf. Remark 7). By construction of u˜ and v˜, the inequalities φ(xi, yj , u) >φ(xi, y0, v0) > u hold for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Because there are an equal number of buyers
and sellers, these inequalities ensure that there are no unmatched agents in a stable outcome
and similarly preclude the possibility that any seller with yk 6= y0 obtains her reservation
utility in a stable outcome. Hence, it follows from Lemma 3 in Demange and Gale (1985)
that this matching model with a finite number of agents has a stable outcome in which all
buyers and sellers are matched and sellers with yk = y0 obtain their reservation utility. This
implies (cf. Appendix A.8) that the finite-support matching model (X,Y, φ, n ·µn, n ·νn,u˜,v˜)
has a fully matched stable outcome (λ̂n,un,vn) satisfying the initial condition v(y0) = v0.
As any fully matched stable outcome is also pairwise stable and the pairwise stability
conditions do not depend on the reservation utility profiles, the outcome (λ̂n,un,vn) is also
pairwise stable for the finite-support matching model (X,Y, φ, n · µn, n · νn,u,v). Letting
λn = λ̂n/n, it is obvious that (λn,un,vn) is a pairwise stable outcome for the matching
model (X,Y, φ, µn, νn,u,v). Finally, from Proposition 5.3 we may assume that un and
vn implement each other, giving a pairwise stable outcome (λn,un,vn) satisfying all the





n=1 be sequences in X and Y with y1 = y0 and such that the
probability measures µn and νn defined in (54)–(55) converge weakly to µ, respectively ν.
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The existence of such sequences is assured: for example, if all but x1 and y1 are obtained
by taking sequences of independent random draws from the probability measures µ and
ν, then with probability one we obtain sequences of measures µn and νn that converge
weakly (as n→∞) to the measures µ and ν (e. g. , Villani, 2009, p. 64). For each n, the
matching model (X,Y, φ, µn, νn,u,v) has a pairwise stable outcome (λn,un,vn) satisfying
the properties mentioned in the statement of Lemma 9. Let (λn,un,vn)
∞
n=1 be a sequence
of such outcomes. The following lemma establishes that this sequence has a limit point,
which is the pairwise stable outcome we seek.
Lemma 10. Let Assumption 1 hold. The sequence (λn,un,vn)
∞
n=1 has a subsequence
converging (weakly in the case of the measures λn, and in norm for the profiles) to a
pairwise stable outcome (λ∗,u∗,v∗) of the matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) that satisfies
v∗(y0) = v0.
Proof of Lemma 10 Because each of the probability measures λn is defined on the
compact (and hence separable) metric space X × Y , the collection {λn}∞n=1 is tight, and
Prokhorov’s theorem (Shiryaev, 1996, p. 318) ensures that there is a subsequence of (λn)
∞
n=1
converging weakly to a probability measure λ∗ on X×Y . Further, as each λn is a full match,
so is λ∗, that is, conditions (30)–(31) are preserved in the limit (see Villani, 2009, p.64). For
convenience of notation, we assume that the sequence (λn)
∞
n=1 itself converges to λ
∗.




n=1 are bounded. Because {un}∞n=1
and {vn}∞n=1 are sets of implementable profiles, Corollary 4.2 then ensures that both of
these sets are equicontinuous so that it follows from the Arzela-Ascoli theorem (Kelley, 1955,
p. 233) that (un,vn)
∞
n=1 has a subsequence (which, for notational convenience, we take
to be the sequence itself) converging to some limit (u∗,v∗). As the sets of implementable
profiles are closed (Corollary 4.1) it follows that u∗ and v∗ are implementable. Further,
the arguments in the proof of Corollary 4.1 show that (u∗,v∗) implement each other. As
vn(y0) = v0 holds for all n, we obtain v
∗(y0) = v0. In light of Proposition 5 the desired
result then follows provided that supp(λ∗) ⊆ Γu∗,v∗ holds, that is, we need to establish
u∗(x) = φ(x, y,v∗(y))
for all (x, y) ∈ supp(λ∗). The weak convergence of the sequence (λn)∞n=1 to λ∗ ensures that
for every (x, y) in the support of λ∗, there is a sequence (xn, yn)
∞
n=1, with each (xn, yn) in
the support of λn, converging to (x, y). For each n and each (xn, yn) ∈ supp(λn), we have
un(xn) = φ(xn, yn,vn(yn)).




n=1 of continuous profiles
to the continuous profiles (u∗,v∗) then gives the result.




n=1. To do so, we
first recall that in the pairwise stable outcome (λn,un,vn) of the nth matching model, the
profiles un and vn implement each other and (because y1 = y0) satisfy vn(y1) = v0. Hence,
for each n and x, we have




providing us with a lower bound for (un)
∞
n=1. Similarly, we note that some buyer is matched
with seller y1. The ability of any seller to match with this buyer puts a lower bound on vn.
We cannot be sure which buyer is involved in such a match, but we know that the buyer in
question receives utility φ(x, y1, v0), and so we have
vn(y) ≥ min
x∈X
ψ(y, x, φ(x, y1, v0)),
providing us with a lower bound for (vn)
∞
n=1. By the order reversal property of the
implementation maps (Corollary 1.2) the lower bound on (un)
∞
n=1 provides us with an upper
bound on (vn)
∞
n=1 and the lower bound on (vn)
∞
n=1 provides us with an upper bound on
(un)
∞




n=1 are bounded, finishing the
proof.
This completes the proof of Proposition 6.
A.12 Proof of Corollary 5
Fix a matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) satisfying Assumption 1. We construct an aug-
mented matching model (X0, Y0, φ0, µ0, ν0,u0,v0) as follows.
First, we augment the type spaces X and Y by adding dummy types x0 and y0, where
x0 and y0 are elements of the metric spaces containing X and Y but are not contained in X
or Y . We let X0 = X ∪ {x0} and Y0 = Y ∪ {y0}.
Second, the reservation utility profiles u0 and v0 duplicate u on X and v on Y , with
u(x0) = v(y0) = 0.
Third, we let the generating function φ0 equal φ on X × Y × R, and then extend φ0 to
X0 × Y0 × R by defining
φ0(x, y0, v) = u(x)− v
φ0(x0, y, v) = v(y)− v
φ0(x0, y0, v) = − v.
We let ψ0 denote the inverse generating function associated with φ0. Note that ψ0 satisfies
ψ0(y, x0, u) = v(y)− u, indicating that any type of seller y receives her reservation utility
v(y) when matching with a buyer x0 who receives her reservation utility u0(x0) = 0, thus
mirroring the utility obtained by a buyer of any type x who matches with y0.
Fourth, the measure µ0 duplicates µ on the set X, and attaches mass ν(Y ) + 1 to the
isolated point x0. Similarly, the measure ν0 duplicates ν on the set Y , and attaches mass
µ(X) + 1 to the isolated point y0. Note that µ0(X0) = ν0(Y0) = 1 + µ(X) + ν(Y ) holds, and
so the matching model (X0, Y0, φ0, µ0, ν0,u0,v0) is balanced.
The augmented matching model (X0, Y0, φ0, µ0, ν0,u0,v0) features continuous reservation
utility profiles and satisfies Assumption 1: the sets X0 and Y0 are compact because X and
Y are so, and the generating function φ0 satisfies the full range condition and is continuous
because the profiles u and v used in the construction of the extension of φ are (by assumption)
continuous.
With any full match λ0 for (X0, Y0, φ0, µ0, ν0,u0,v0) we associate the match λ for
(X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) obtained by restricting λ0 to X×Y . Vice versa, we can extend any match
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λ for (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) to a full match λ0 for (X0, Y0, φ0, µ0, ν0,u0,v0) by assigning the
masses of unmatched agents to the dummy agents and matching the remaining masses of the
dummy agents with each other. That is, we associate with λ the uniquely defined measure
λ0 satisfying
λ0(X̃ × {y0}) = µ(X̃)− λX(X̃)
λ0({x0} × Ỹ ) = ν(Ỹ )− λY (Ỹ )
for all measurable X̃ ⊆ X and Ỹ ⊆ Y , and
λ0({x0} × {y0}) = 1 + λ(X × Y ).
We say that a full outcome (λ,u0,v0) for (X0, Y0, φ0, µ0, ν0,u0,v0) and an outcome (λ,u,v)
for (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) are associated if (i) λ0 and λ are associated, (ii) u is the restriction
of u0 to X, and (iii) v is the restriction of v0 to Y .
Because the augmented matching model (X0, Y0, φ0, µ0, ν0,u0,v0) is balanced, we can
invoke Proposition 6 to conclude that it has a pairwise stable outcome (λ0,u0,v0) satisfying
u0(x0) = 0. The proof is then completed by the “if” direction of the following lemma. (The
“only-if” direction of the lemma will be required in the proof of the subsequent Proposition
8.)
Lemma 11. Let the matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) satisfy Assumption 1. Then
(λ,u,v) is a stable outcome of (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) if and only if it is associated with a
pairwise stable outcome (λ0,u0,v0), satisfying u(x0) = 0, of the augmented matching model
(X0, Y0, φ0, µ0, ν0,u0,v0).
Proof of Lemma 11. Suppose the outcome (λ0,u0,v0) is a pairwise stable outcome of the
augmented matching model (X0, Y0, φ0, µ0, ν0,u0,v0) with u(x0) = 0 and let (λ,u,v) be the
associated outcome of (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v). The measures µ0 and ν0 have been constructed so
that λ0(x0, y0) = 1 + λ0(X × Y ) > 0 holds for any full match λ0 in the augmented matching
model. Together with the equality u(x0) = 0, the feasibility condition (24) for types (x0, y0)
in the augmented matching model then implies v0(y0) = 0. For any type x ∈ supp(µ), (29)
in the augmented matching model then implies u(x) ≥ φ0(x, y0, 0) = u(x) and similarly
v(y) ≥ ψ0(y, x0, 0) = v(y) for all y ∈ supp(ν). Thus, the participation constraints (27)–
(28) in the associated outcome (λ,u,y) for the matching model hold. Next, the incentive
constraints (29) in the augmented matching model,
u0(x) ≥ φ0(x, y,v(y)) ∀(x, y) ∈ supp(ν0)× supp(µ0),
imply
u(x) ≥ φ(x, y,v(y)) ∀(x, y) ∈ supp(ν)× supp(µ),
which are the incentive constraints in the matching model. It remains to check the feasibility
conditions (24)–(26) to infer that (λ,u,v) is a stable outcome of (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v). As λ
and λ0 coincide on X × Y , the feasibility conditions for the augmented matching model
immediately imply u(x) = φ(x, y,v(y)) for all (x, y) in the support of λ, which is (24). It
remains only to show that buyers x in the support of µ− λX and sellers y in the support of
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µ− λY receive their reservation utilities. For such types, we have that (x, y0) and (y, x0) are
in the support of λ0, so that (recalling the equalities u0(x0) = v0(y0) = 0 and the definition
of φ0), the feasibility condition
u0(x) = φ(x, y,v0(y)), ∀(x, y) ∈ supp(λ0)
for the augmented matching model imply u(x) = u(x) and v(y) = v(y), which is the desired
result.
Conversely, suppose the outcome (λ,u,v) is a stable outcome of the matching model
(X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v). Let the profiles u0 ∈ B(X0) and u0 ∈ B(X0) agree with u amd v on
X and Y and satisfy u0(x0) = 0 and v0(x0) = 0. It suffices to show that (λ0,u0,v0) is a
pairwise stable outcome of the matching model (X0, Y0, φ0, µ0, ν0,u0,v0). The equalities
u0(x0) = 0 and v0(y0) = 0 hold by construction. Feasibility and the conditions for pairwise
stability follow from the feasibility and stability conditions for (λ,u,v) in the matching model
(X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) via arguments analogous to those establishing the previous direction.
This completes the proof of Corollary 5.
A.13 Proof of Proposition 7.
Let (λ1,u1,v1) and (λ2,u2,v2) be pairwise stable outcomes. Because the type measures µ
and ν have full support (Assumption 2), Proposition 5.3 then implies that u1 and v1 as well
as u2 and v2 implement each other.
To show that U and V are sublattices of B(X) and B(Y ), it suffices to show that there
exist full matches λ3 and λ4 such that (λ3,u1 ∨ u2,v1 ∧ v2) and (λ4,u1 ∧ u2,v1 ∨ v2) are
pairwise stable outcomes. The conditions for the pairwise stability of these two outcomes
differ from each other only by a reversal of the role of the buyer profiles and the seller
profiles, so that we may focus on the first of these, namely the existence of a full match λ3
such that (λ3,u1 ∨ u2,v1 ∧ v2) is a pairwise stable outcome.
Because v1 implements u1 and v2 implements u2, it is immediate from the fact that
the implementation maps are dualities that v1 ∧ v2 implements u1 ∨ u2 (cf. Corollary 1.4
and the discussion at the beginning of Section 3.4.2). Hence, from Proposition 5.1 and 5.2
it suffices to construct a full match λ3 with supp(λ3) ⊆ Γu1∨u2,v1∧v2 to obtain the desired
pairwise stable outcome (λ3,u1 ∨ u2,v1 ∧ v2).
To simplify notation throughout the following, let u3 = u1 ∨u2 and v3 = v1 ∧ v2. Using
this notation, we may rewrite the condition supp(λ3) ⊆ Γu1∨u2,v1∧v2 as
(x, y) ∈ supp(λ3)⇒ u3(x) = φ(x, y,v3(y)). (56)
Our task is to construct a full match λ3 satisfying (56). To do so, we define
Y1 = {y ∈ Y : v1(y) < v2(y)}
and
X1 = {x ∈ X : Yv2(x) ∩ Y1 6= ∅}.
Let X2 = X \X1 and Y2 = Y \ Y1 denote the complements of X1 and Y1.
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S tep 1: The sets X1, X2, Y1, and Y2 are measurable.
That Y1 ⊆ Y is measurable is immediate from the continuity of the implementable
assignments v1 and v2, which ensures that Y1 is open in Y . The argmax correspondence
Yv2 is weakly measurable (cf. footnote 39), and hence the pre-image of the open set Y1
under Yv2 , namely X1, is measurable. As the complements of measurable sets, X2 and Y2
are measurable.
S tep 2: The measures λ1 and λ2 are both concentrated on (X1 × Y1) ∪ (X2 × Y2).
Recall that v2 and u2 implement each other. By definition of X1 and Lemma 2, we thus
have that Γu2,v2 and X2 × Y1 do not intersect each other. Because supp(λ2) is contained in
Γu2,v2 (Proposition 5.1) it follows that the support of λ2 does not intersect X2 × Y1 so that
λ2(X2 × Y1) = 0 (57)
holds. Because λ2 is a full match, (57) implies λ2(X1 × Y1) = ν(Y1). Consequently, we have
µ(X1) ≥ λ2(X1 × Y1) = ν(Y1), (58)
where the inequality obtains because λ2 is a match.
Next, we have
λ1(X1 × Y2) = 0. (59)
To establish this, consider any x′ ∈ X1. By definition of X1, there exists y′ ∈ Y1 such that
u2(x
′) = φ(x′, y′,v2(y
′)) ≥ φ(x′, y,v2(y)), with the inequality holding for all y ∈ Y . As
v1(y
′) < v2(y
′) holds (because y′ ∈ Y1) and v1 implements u1 we obtain
u1(x
′) ≥ φ(x′, y′,v1(y′)) > φ(x′, y′,v2(y′)) ≥ φ(x′, y,v2(y))
for all y ∈ Y . As v1(y) ≥ v2(y) holds for all y ∈ Y2 this implies u1(x′) > φ(x′, y,v1(y))
for all y ∈ Y2. As (λ1,u1,v1) is pairwise stable, this implies that there does not exist
(x, y) ∈ X1 × Y2 contained in the support of λ1, establishing (59).
Because λ1 is a match, we have ν(Y1) ≥ λ1(X1 × Y1). Using the fact that λ1 is a full
match, (59) implies λ1(X1 × Y1) = µ(X1), and hence we have
ν(Y1) ≥ λ1(X1 × Y1) = µ(X1). (60)
Combining (58) and (60) yields
λ1(X1 × Y1) = λ2(X1 × Y1) = µ(X1) = ν(Y1). (61)
Because λ1 and λ2 are matches, this in turn implies λ1(X2 × Y1) = 0 and λ2(X1 × Y2) = 0,
finishing the argument for this step.
S tep 3: Completion of the proof that U and V are sublattices.
By Step 1, setting
λ3(X̃ × Ỹ ) = λ1((X̃ ∩X1)× (Ỹ ∩ Y1)) + λ2((X̃ ∩X2)× (Ỹ ∩ Y2)) (62)
for all measurable Ỹ ⊆ Y and X̃ ⊆ X defines a measure on X × Y . By Step 2, λ3 is a full
match. It remains to show (56). To obtain this we show first that u3(x) = φ(x, y,v3(y)
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holds on a subset of X × Y on which λ3 is concentrated and then use a continuity argument
to extend the result to the support of λ3.
By construction, λ3 is concentrated on (X1 × Y1) ∪ (X2 × Y2). It is therefore also
concentrated on the union of supp(λ3)∩ (X1× Y1) and supp(λ3)∩ (X × Y2), where X is any
measurable subset of X2 satisfying λ3(X × Y2) = λ3(X2 × Y2).
Consider (x′, y′) ∈ supp(λ3) ∩ (X1 × Y1). By construction of λ3 we then have (x′, y′) ∈
supp(λ1), implying u1(x
′) = φ(x′, y′,v1(y
′)). As y′ ∈ Y1, we have v1(y′) = v3(y′). As
x′ ∈ X1, the argument that we have used to establish (59) in Step 2 yields u1(x′) > u2(x′)
and thus u3(x
′) = u1(x
′), establishing (56) for the case under consideration.
Let
X = {x ∈ X2 | Yv1 ∩ Y2 6= ∅}
An argument akin to the one used in Step 1 of the proof shows that X is measurable.40 By
definition of X , (x, y) ∈ (X2\X )×Y2 implies (x, y) 6∈ supp(λ1), so that λ1((X2\X )×Y2) = 0
holds. Because λ1 is a full match, this in turn implies λ1((X2 \ X )× Y1) = µ(X2 \ X ) with
λ1(X2×Y1) = 0 (cf. Step 2 of the proof) then implying µ(X2\X ) = 0, yielding µ(X ) = µ(X2).
As λ3(X ×Y2) = µ(X ) and λ3(X2×Y2) = µ(X2) holds, this establishes the requisite property
λ3(X × Y2) = λ3(X2 × Y2) of the set X .
Consider now (x′, y′) ∈ supp(λ3) ∩ (X × Y2). By construction of λ3 we then have
(x′, y′) ∈ supp(λ2), implying u2(x′) = φ(x′, y′,v2(y′)). As y′ ∈ Y2, we have v3(y′) = v2(y′),
so that it remains to establish u2(x
′) ≥ u1(x′) to obtain (56) for the case under consideration.
Suppose to the contrary that u1(x
′) > u2(x
′) holds. As v2(y) ≤ v1(y) holds on Y2 this
implies u1(x
′) > φ(x′, y,v1(y)) for all y ∈ Y2, which contradicts x′ ∈ X .
Finally, consider any (x′, y′) ∈ supp(λ3). As λ3 is concentrated on the union of supp(λ3)∩
(X1 × Y1) and supp(λ3) ∩ (X × Y2), there then exists a sequence (xn, yn)∞n=1 in this union
which converges to (x′, y′). As shown above u3(xn) = φ(xn, yn,v3(yn)) holds for all n in





′) = φ(x′, y′,v3(y
′)), which is the desired result.
It remains to show that the set of pairwise stable outcomes for the matching model
(X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) is closed. Let (λk,uk,vk) be a sequence of pairwise stable outcomes for
the matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) converging to (λ∗,u∗,v∗). Using the assumption
that µ and ν have full support, Proposition 5 implies that (uk,vk) implement each other
for all k. The same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 10 (in Appendix A.11) then imply
that (λ∗,u∗,v∗) is a pairwise stable outcome for (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v).
A.14 Proof of Proposition 8
We establish that the set of stable buyer profiles of the matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v),
denoted by Us in the following, is a complete sublattice of B(X); the argument for the case
of stable seller profiles is analogous.
From Lemma 11 in the proof of Proposition 5 (Appendix A.11) an outcome (λ,u,v) is
stable in the matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) if and only if the associated full outcome
40As the complement of the open set Y1, the set Y2 is closed with Theorem 17.20 in Aliprantis and Border
(2006) then ensuring that {x ∈ X | Yv1 ∩ Y2 6= ∅} is measurable. As the intersection of this set with the
measurable set X2, the set X is measurable.
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(λ0,u0,v0) is a pairwise stable outcome satisfying the initial condition u0(x0) = 0 in the
augmented matching model (X0, Y0, φ0, µ0, ν0,u0,v0). Denote the set of pairwise stable
buyer profiles satisfying the initial condition u0(x0) = 0 in the augmented matching model
by Ua. With the obvious notational convention for the profile (u0(x0),u) of the augmented
matching model, we then have (u0(x0),u) ∈ Ua if and only if both u0(x0) = 0 and u ∈ Us
hold. It is then immediate that Us is a complete sublattice of B(X) if Ua is a complete
sublattice of B(X0).
To show that Ua, which is non-empty by Proposition 5, is a complete sublattice of B(X0),
we first observe that Ua is the intersection of two closed sublattices of B(X0), namely the
set of pairwise stable buyer profiles of the augmented matching model (which is closed by
Proposition 6 and a sublattice by Proposition 7) and the set of profiles u0 ∈ B(X0) satisfying
u0(x0) = 0 (which is obviously a sublattice and closed). Hence, Ua is a closed sublattice
of B(X0). Further, the closed sublattice Ua is bounded, with the profile u0 providing a
lower bound and the profile Φv0 providing an upper bound. Hence (Corollary 4.3), Ua is a
compact sublattice and therefore (by the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 4, cf.
Footnote 38) complete.
A.15 Proof of Lemma 6
Step 1: We first argue that it is without loss of generality to restrict the principal’s choice
set to implementable tariffs: Let (λ,u,v) ∈ M × B(X) × B(Y ) be any triple satisfying
the constraints in the principal’s maximization problem defined in Section 5.1. Consider
the triple (λ,u,Ψu). The tariff Ψu is implementable and implements u and, further,
implements any selection from Yv (Corollary 3.1), so that Yv(x) ⊆ YΨu(x) holds for all
x ∈ X. Consequently, we have Γu,v ⊆ Γu,Ψu, ensuring that the triple (λ,u,Ψu) is in the
feasible set of the principal’s problem. As we have noted in the text following equation (34),
the feasibility of (λ,u,Ψu) implies that it results in the same expected payoff as (λ,u,v).
Step 2: From Step 1 we can restrict attention to (λ,u,v) ∈ M × B(X) × I(Y ) when
considering the principal’s problem. As v ∈ I(Y ) implements u ∈ B(Y ) if and only if
u = Φv, we can eliminate the first constraint from the principal’s problem and substitute








s.t. supp(λ) ⊆ ΓΦv,v and Φv ≥ u.
Because implementable profiles are continuous (Proposition 2), the objective function in
this problem is well-defined for all v ∈ I(Y ) and λ ∈M. Using (i) the definition of F (v, λ) in
(35), (ii) observing that the first constraint is equivalent to λ ∈ G(v), where G(v) is defined
in (36), and (iii) using the order reversal property of the implementation maps (Corollary










Step 3: Let (vn)
∞
n=1 converge in norm to v and let (λn)
∞
n=1 converge weakly to λ. Then for
any ε > 0, we can find N such that for all n ≥ N , we have









































π(x, y,v(y))dλ(x, y) + 2ε
= F (v, λ) + 2ε.
The two central inequalities follow from the convergence of (vn)∞n=1, and the two remaining
inequalities from the convergence of (λn)
∞
n=1. Combining the middle and outside two terms,
we have F (v, λ)− 2ε ≤ F (vn, λn) ≤ F (v, λ) + 2ε. Hence, the function F (v, λ) is continuous.
Step 4: For v ∈ I(Y ), the correspondence G(v) defined in (36) is non-empty and compact
valued and upper hemicontinuous. To show that G(v) is non-empty valued, let y be a
measurable selection (cf. footnote 39) from Yv and let λy be the associated deterministic
measure (cf. (32)). As v and Φv implement each other, the same argument as in the first
paragraph of the proof of Lemma 5 yields that the support of λy is contained in ΓΦv,v.
Hence, G(v) is non-empty valued.
To obtain the other two properties, define the function H : X × Y × I(Y ) → R by
H(x, y,v) = φ(x, y,v(y)) − Φv(x). Notice that H is continuous because φ and Φ are
(Lemma 1). In addition, H(x, y,v) ≤ 0, with equality if and only if (x, y) ∈ ΓΦv,v. Now
consider the maximization problem maxλ∈M Ĥ(v, λ), where Ĥ : I(Y )×M→ R is defined




Y H(x, y,v)dλ(x, y). For any v, we have Ĥ(v, λ) ≤ 0, with equality if
and only if supp(λ) ∈ ΓΦv,v. The argmax correspondence for this maximization problem
thus is G(v). We have noted that H(x, y,v) is continuous and hence so is Ĥ(v, λ), and M
is compact by Prokhorov’s theorem (Shiryaev, 1996, p. 318). An application of Berge’s
maximum theorem (Ok, 2007, p. 306) then ensures that G(v) is compact-valued and upper
hemicontinuous.




We have shown in Step 3 that F (v, λ) is continuous and in Step 4 that G(v) is nonempty and
compact valued. Therefore, Weierstrass’ extreme value theorem ensures that this problem
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has a solution so that the function Π : I(Y ) → R is well-defined. Further, because the
correspondence G is also upper hemicontinuous (Step 4), Berge’s maximum theorem (Ok,
2007, p. 306) ensures that Π is upper semicontinuous.




and let λ∗ be an element of arg maxλ∈G(v∗) F (v
∗, λ). Then it is immediate from (37) that









As noted in Step 2, this implies that (λ∗,Φv∗,v∗) solves the principal’s problem when the
principal is restricted to v ∈ I(Y ). Step 1 then ensures that the triple (λ∗,Φv∗,v∗) solves
the principal’s problem.
A.16 Proof of Proposition 9
We proceed in two steps, first establishing the existence of a solution v to the nonlinear
pricing problem (38) and then showing that in the associated solution (λ,Φv,v) to the
principal’s problem, the measure λ can be taken to be deterministic.
Step 1: We first show that we can restrict attention to a bounded set of tariffs. To simplify
notation, let v = Ψu denote the upper bound for the feasible set in the nonlinear pricing
problem. By Proposition 2, we have v ∈ I(Y ), so that Π(v) is well-defined. To obtain a
lower bound, let v† ∈ R be such that for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y
π(x, y, v†) < Π(v).
The existence of such a v† is ensured because π satisfies the full range condition in Assumption
3 and X and Y are compact. By Assumption 1, there also exists v ∈ R such that, for all
(x, y) in X × Y and v ≤ v, we have
φ(x, y, v) > max
ŷ∈Y
φ(x, ŷ, v†).
The second of these displayed inequalities ensures that for any tariff v ∈ I(Y ) with the
property that v(y) ≤ v holds for some y ∈ Y , we have that (x̂, ŷ) ∈ ΓΦv,v implies v(ŷ) < v†.
From the first displayed inequality, this ensures that F (v, λ) < Π(v) holds for all λ ∈ G(v),
implying that Π(v) < Π(v) holds for any such tariff. Hence, Π(v) ≥ Π(v) implies v(y) ≥ v
for all y ∈ Y and there thus exists a tariff v ∈ I(Y ) such that Π(v) ≥ Π(v) implies v ≥ v.
Clearly, we have v ≤ v. Thus, the order interval [v,v] = {v ∈ B(Y )|v ≤ v ≤ v} is a
non-empty, closed, and bounded subset of B(Y ). As I(Y ) is also closed (Corollary 4.1), it
follows that V = [v,v] ∩ I(Y ) is a closed and bounded subset of I(Y ). By Corollary 4.3 V
is therefore compact. As v is an element of both V and I(Y ) this set is also non-empty.
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As Π is upper semicontinuous (Lemma 6), Weierstrass’ extreme value theorem for upper




has a solution v∗. We obviously have Π(v∗) ≥ Π(v) and hence Π(v∗) ≥ Π(v) for all v ∈ I(Y )
satisfying (using the definition of v) v ≤ v = Ψu, ensuring that v∗ solves the nonlinear
pricing problem (38).
Step 2: Let (λ,u,v) be feasible in the principal’s problem with v ∈ I(Y ). We first observe
that maxy∈Yv(x) π(x, y,v(y)) is a measurable function of x and that there exists a measurable
assignment y∗ solving this maximization problem for all x. This follows from Aliprantis and
Border (2006, Theorem 18.19) upon observing that (i) the function (x, y) → π(x, y,v(y))
is continuous on its domain X × Y (from Proposition 2 and Assumption 3) and thus a
Caratheodory function and (ii) the properties of the correspondence Yv noted in Corollary 2
imply that this correspondence has a closed graph, ensuring that it is weakly measurable
(Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Theorem 18.20 and Lemma 18.2).
We can then write
























= F (v, λy∗),
where the equality in the second line follows from the disintegration theorem (Chang and
Pollard, 1997, Theorem 1), with λ(· | x) being the disintegration measure on {x} × Y for
each x ∈ X. The inequality holds because the support of λ(· | x) is contained in Yv(x)
for µ-almost all x ∈ X. The equality on the penultimate line is by definition of y∗. As
(λy∗ ,u,v) is feasible in the principal’s problem and this problem has a solution, the inequality
F (v, λ) ≤ F (v, λy∗) implies that the principal’s problem has a deterministic solution.
A.17 Proof of Proposition 10
Suppose (λ,u,v) solves the principal’s problem with u(x) > u(x) for all x ∈ X. From
Proposition 9 there exists a deterministic match λy, such that (λy,u,v) is also a solution to
the principal’s problem. By the same argument as the one proving Lemma 5, we can take y
to be implementable and therefore (by assumption) to be strongly implementable. From
Lemma 4 there thus exists a profile u∗ such that (u∗,y) is implementable, u ≥ u∗ ≥ u
holds, and there exists x ∈ X such that u(x) > u∗(x) for some x ∈ X. As both u and u∗
are implementable (and therefore continuous by Proposition 2) the set X = {x ∈ X | u(x) >
u∗(x)} is measurable. Because µ has full support, we have µ(X ) > 0.
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Now, let v∗ = Ψu∗. Then v∗ implements (u∗,y) (Corollary 3.1) and the triple (y,u∗,v∗)
is therefore feasible in the principal’s problem We also have that the principal obtains






















where the equalities follow as in (34) and the strict inequality holds because µ(X ) > 0, ψ is
strictly decreasing in its third argument, and π is strictly increasing in its third argument.
A.18 Proof of Proposition 11
Suppose (λ,u,v) is a solution to the principal’s problem with u(x) > u(x) for all x ∈ X.
Then as we have noted in Remark 8, (λ,u,v) is a pairwise stable outcome of the matching
model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v), where ν is the marginal measure λY of λ on Y and v : Y → R
is an arbitrary continuous function. Let Y be the support of ν. It exposes the logic of the
argument most clearly by first proceeding under the assumption that Y = Y .
The assumption Y = Y ensures that the matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) satisfies
Assumption 2, so that this matching model has a pairwise stable outcome (λ̂, û, v̂) satisfying
u ≥ û ≥ u, with the first inequality holding strictly for some x ∈ X (Corollary 7). Because
û and v̂ implement each other (Proposition 5.3) and the implementation maps are order
reversing inverse bijections (cf. (15)), we thus obtain v ≤ v̂ with strict inequality for some
y ∈ Y . From the continuity of the two profiles v and v̂ (Proposition 2) and the assumption
that ν has full support, we thus obtain
ν({y : v(y) < v̂(y)}) > 0. (63)

















π(x, y, v̂(y))dλ̂(x, y),
where the equalities are from the private-values assumption and the inequality follows from
(63) because π̂ is strictly increasing in its second argument (Assumption 3). We thus obtain
F (v, λ) > F (v̂, λ̂). As (λ̂, û, v̂) is feasible in the principal’s problem, this contradicts the
optimality of (λ,u,v).
If Y is a strict subset of Y , then the above argument is not directly applicable because
the matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) violates the full support condition in Assumption 2.
It is, however, straightforward to establish a “restriction lemma” (similar in spirit to the
extension result of Proposition 5.3) showing that if (λ,u,v) is a pairwise stable outcome of
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the matching model (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v), then (λ,u,v) can be restricted to give a pairwise
stable outcome of the matching model derived from (X,Y, φ, µ, ν,u,v) by restricting the
sets X and Y to the supports X and Y of µ and ν. This latter model satisfies Assumption
2, allowing us to repeat the argument above (and in particular to apply Corollary 7). The
conclusion of this argument is that the principal can secure a higher payoff than under
(λ,u,v), even if restricted to assigning only decisions in Y to the agents.
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